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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : Case No- 900560-CA 
v. : 
FOSTER M. LEONARD, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The issues presented in this petition for rehearing are 
(1) whether this Court's apparent characterization of the 
officers' "open view" observations as a "search" in need of 
constitutional justification was erroneous, and (2) whether this 
Court erroneously set forth the plain view exception to the 
warrant requirement as an additional justification for the 
warrantless search of defendant's vehicle. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Foster M. Leonard, was charged with two 
counts of possession of a controlled substance (ephedrine and 
hidrotic acid), second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37c-4(b) (Supp. 1991); possession of equipment with 
intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 (Supp. 1991); 
conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance, 
(methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 (Supp. 1991) and 76-4-201 (1990); and giving 
false information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (Supp. 1991) (Record 
[hereinafter R.] 12-13). 
Following the trial court's denial of his motions to 
suppress evidence, defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty 
to the charges of possession of equipment with intent to 
manufacture a controlled substance and conspiracy to manufacture 
a controlled substance, as third degree felonies, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 (Supp. 1991) and Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-
37-8 (Supp. 1991) and 76-4-201 (1990) (R. 44, 51, 65, 113-21 
(motions to suppress), 151-58 (statement of defendant), 108-12 
(trial court's ruling)). 
Defendant was subsequently sentenced to not more than 
five years on each count and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine on each 
count, sentences to run concurrently (R. 189-87). 
On appeal, this Court affirmed defendant's conviction. 
State v. Leonard, No. 900560-CA (Utah App. Dec. 5, 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
For purposes of this petition, this Court's statement 
of the facts is generally sufficient. See State v. Leonard, No. 
900560-CA, slip op. at 1-3 (Utah App. Dec. 5, 1991) (a copy of 
the opinion is attached as Addendum A). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The "open view" or "plain sight" observations of 
investigating officers did not constitute a search in the 
constitutional sense of that term and thus did not require 
justification pursuant to any exception to the warrant 
requirement of the fourth amendment. The subsequent entry into 
defendant's vehicle for purposes of seizing contraband, however, 
was justified by the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement, which is the sole exception to that requirement 
applicable here. This Court's footnote to the main opinion, 
setting forth the plain view doctrine as additional justification 
for the warrantless search of or entry into defendant's vehicle 
is erroneous as that doctrine has no application to the instant 
facts. Thus, due to the great potential for confusion by law 
enforcement looking to this Court for guidance as to permissible 
conduct in this sensitive area of the law, the State asks this 
Court to modify footnote 11 and omit the erroneous and 
superfluous dicta pertaining to the plain view doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court 
has either "misapplied or overlooked [law] which materially 
affects the result." See Cummins v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-
73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913). The argument portion of this brief 
will demonstrate that the State's petition for rehearing is 
properly before the Court and should be granted. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE "OPEN VIEW" OBSERVATIONS OF INVESTIGATING 
OFFICERS DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SEARCH IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE OF THAT TERM AND THUS 
DID NOT REQUIRE JUSTIFICATION PURSUANT TO ANY 
EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT; MOREOVER, THE PLAIN VIEW 
DOCTRINE IS NOT TRIGGERED BY THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE AND DOES NOT SERVE AS AN ADDITIONAL 
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY OF 
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE. 
The State acknowledges that this Court affirmed 
defendant's third degree felony convictions for possession of 
equipment with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, and 
for conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance. See State 
v. Leonard, No. 900560-CA, slip op. at 1 (Utah App. Dec. 5, 
1991). In so doing this Court upheld the warrantless search of 
defendant's vehicle, correctly applying the automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. .Id. at 12-
14. Insofar as this Court's justification for the warrantless 
search rests upon the automobile exception it is entirely proper; 
however, in an extraneous footnote, this Court appears to 
characterize the "open view" or "plain sight" observations of the 
investigating officers as a warrantless search in the 
constitutional sense of that term. .Id. at 14 n.11. As a result 
of that characterization, this Court apparently attempts to 
justify the officers' observations, as well as the subsequent 
search of defendant's vehicle, under the plain view exception to 
the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. Jlci. It is 
this, extraneous characterization and application of the plain 
view exception which proves troubling to the State. 
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Thus, the issues presented in this petition are (1) 
whether this Court's apparent characterization of the officers' 
"open view" observations as a "search" in need of constitutional 
justification was proper, and (2) whether this Court properly set 
forth the plain view exception to the warrant requirement as an 
additional justification for the warrantless search of 
defendant's vehicle. Due to the great potential for confusion by 
law enforcement looking to this Court for guidance as to 
permissible conduct in this sensitive area of the law, the State 
asks this Court to modify its opinion and omit the erroneous and 
superfluous dicta contained in footnote 11. 
A. Search. 
At the outset of the State's analysis it is important 
to clarify that the sole "search" issue raised by the instant 
facts is the warrantless entry of defendant's vehicle. Contrary 
to the apparent reasoning of this Court, the "plain view" 
observations of Officers Caldwell and Fox, through the windows of 
defendant's vehicle, did not amount to a "search" in the 
constitutional sense of that term.1 State v. Lee, 633 P. 2d 48, 
50-51 (Utah), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981); State v. 
Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983). 
At this point in the State's analysis, it is helpful to 
point out a critical distinction between the plain view exception 
1
 Specifically, this Court states that "none of the 
officers testified that they actually conducted a search of 
defendant's vehicle, only that they had seen the box containing 
the Intertech purchase on the back seat." Leonard, slip op. at 
14, n.ll. 
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to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment, to be 
discussed in greater detail, supra, and the concept of "open 
view" or "plain sight" discussed here. "'Plain view' is the term 
uniformly given to the doctrine invoked as justification for 
seizing evidence without a warrant at the time of an arrest." 
Lee, 633 P.2d at 51 n.l (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443 (1971)); Harris, 671 P.2d at 181 (noting that plain view 
"never occurs until a lawful search (usually under a warrant) is 
in progress"). Accord State v. Powell, 99 N.M. 381f 658 P.2d 
456, 459-60 (N.M.App.), cert, denied, 99 N.M. 358, 658 P.2d 433 
(N.M. 1983); State v. Bverlv, 635 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tenn. 1982), 
abrogated on other grounds, Horton v. California, U.S. , 
110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990); State v. Planz, 304 N.W.2d 74, 80 (N.D. 
1981). As such, the plain view exception "'authorizes seizure of 
illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer' only if 
the officer's 'access to the object' itself has a 'Fourth 
Amendment justification.'" La Fave, Search and Seizure, § 2.2(a) 
p. 324 (1987 & Supp. 1991) (citing Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 
765 (1983)). 
"'Open view' or 'plain sight,'" on the other hand, are 
the non-search terms appropriately used to describe the lawful 
observations of the investigating officers discussed here, and to 
distinguish those observations from the plain view doctrine. 
Lee, 633 P.2d at 50 n.l.2 "It has long been the law that 
2
 The Lee Court noted that considerable confusion may be 
engendered, where, as may have happened in this case, the same 
term is used to describe the two very different concepts. Id. 
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objects falling within the plain view of an officer from a 
position where he is entitled to be are not the subject of an 
unlawful search." Lee, 633 P.2d at 50-51. As acknowledged by 
this Court, the initial investigatory stop of defendant's vehicle 
was supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity, Leonard, slip op. at 6; thus, the officers observations 
were made from a position they were lawfully entitled to be. 
Lee, 633 P.2d at 50-51. Where, as here, an officer approaches a 
legitimately stopped vehicle, "[he] is not expected to ignore 
what is exposed to observation from a position where he is 
lawfully entitled to be, and he may view the interior of a 
vehicle from such a position." Id..; Harris, 671 P. 2d at 179 ("It 
is well established law that a government official does not 
engage in a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if 
he observes incriminating evidence from a place where he has a 
right to be."). Therefore, insofar as this Court appears to 
characterize the officers' observations as a "search" needing 
constitutional justification, that characterization is erroneous. 
B. Justification for Warrantless Entry. 
Given the validity of the stop and the open view, non-
search observations of the officers, it remains for the State to 
justify the subsequent entry and seizure of contraband from 
inside defendant's vehicle. Contrary to the reasoning of this 
Court, Leonard, slip op. at 14 n.ll, the officers' entry into 
See also La Fave, Search and Seizure, § 2.2(a) pp. 323-25 (1987 & 
Supp. 1991). 
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defendant's vehicle cannot be justified solely by their 
observations of contraband from outside the vehicle. Although 
the officers viewing was entirely proper and contributed toward 
establishing probable cause for the subsequent vehicle search, 
absent exigent circumstances, the officers were not authorized to 
make a warrantless entry into defendant's vehicle (a 
constitutionally protected area), for purposes of seizing 
contraband. Harris, 671 P.2d at 179; Lee, 633 P.2d at 50; State 
v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 543 (Utah App. 1990). As noted by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Harris: 
probable cause alone is never enough to 
search for and seize contraband without a 
warrant. If it were, the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment would be rendered a nullity 
and probable cause alone would make all 
warrantless searches per se reasonable. 
Absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless 
entry to search for weapons or contraband is 
unconstitutional, even when a felony has been 
committed and there is probable cause to 
believe that incriminating evidence will be 
found within. 
671 P.2d at 179 (citations omitted). 
The instant warrantless search of defendant's vehicle, 
i.e., the officers entry into the vehicle, was justified by the 
exigent circumstances inherent in the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. See La Fave, Search 
and Seizure, § 7.5(a) pp. 128-29 (1987) (noting that the 
warrantless search of vehicles on probable cause has been upheld 
even absent true exigent circumstances under the automobile 
exception). Accordingly, the State argued the applicability of 
the automobile exception in its responsive brief (a copy of which 
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is attached as Addendum B), and this Court correctly articulated 
that exception as justification for the warrantless vehicle 
search, holding in part as follows: 
Thus, where as here, a vehicle is lawfully 
stopped based on a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity, a warrantless search is 
justified where the officers have probable 
cause to believe contraband is contained in 
the vehicle. . . . Reviewing all of the 
information available to the officers in the 
present case, we hold that there was probable 
cause to justify the search. Officers 
Caldwell and Fox both testified that they 
observed drug paraphernalia and chemicals in 
plain view in the vehicle. 
Leonard, slip op. at 13-14. 
However, upon determining that the warrantless vehicle 
search was justified by the automobile exception, this Court went 
on to suggest that the testimony of Officers Fox and Caldwell 
"raises an interesting question in that none of the officers 
testified that they actually conducted a search of defendant's 
vehicle, only that they had seen the box containing the Intertech 
purchase on the back seat." Id., at 14 n.ll. This Court then 
proceeded to observe that "a second exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is the plain view exception," 
and, relying on State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah App. 
1989), asserted that that exception is properly applicable to the 
instant facts: 
Determining whether the plain view 
exception applies requires application of a 
three-pronged test: (1) the officer's 
presence must be lawful; (2) the evidence 
must be in plain view; and (3) the evidence 
must clearly be incriminating. 
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It is clear that in the present case, 
the officers' presence was lawful. We have 
already established there was reasonable 
suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle. It is 
also clear from the record that the box 
containing the glassware and chemicals was 
clearly visible in the back seat of the 
vehicle. As for the third prong, "clearly 
incriminating" has been defined as "probable 
cause to associate the property with criminal 
activity." In this case, there is evidence 
to suggest that the contents of the box were 
associated with criminal activity because all 
of the items purchased are used in the 
manufacture of illegal substances, and are 
rarely purchased in combination for any other 
purpose. Thus, all of the requirements for 
the plain view exception are satisfied. 
Id. at 14 n.ll (citations omitted). To the extent that footnote 
11 suggests that the plain view exception somehow justifies the 
officers entry into defendant's vehicle, it is erroneous and 
reflects a basic misunderstanding of the plain view doctrine. 
See Coolidae v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Lee, 633 P.2d 
at 51, n.l; Harris, 671 P.2d at 179; Menke, 787 P.2d at 543. 
As noted previously, the plain view exception is 
primarily a seizure doctrine with exclusive reference 
to the legal justification - the 
reasonableness - for the seizure of evidence 
which has not been particularly described in 
a warrant and which is inadvertently3 
spotted in the course of a constitutional 
search already in progress or in the course 
of an otherwise justifiable intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area. It has no 
applicability when the vantage point from 
which the 'plain view' is made is not within 
a constitutionally protected area. 
3
 The United States Supreme Court recently held that 
inadvertence is not a necessary condition of a legitimate plain 
view seizure. Horton v. California, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2301 
(1990). 
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State v. Scales, 13 Md.App. 474, 284 A.2d 45, 47 n.l 
(Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1971). See also Lee, 633 P.2d at 51 n.l; 
Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 181 (noting that plain view "never occurs 
until a lawful search (usually under a warrant) is in progress"). 
Accord Powell, 658 P.2d at 459-60; Bverlv, 635 S.W.2d at 513; 
Planz, 304 N.W.2d at 80. Thus, contrary to this Court's 
assertion, Leonard, slip op. at 14 n.ll, the plain view exception 
is inapplicable "until there has been a valid 'intrusion' into a 
constitutionally protected area." Planz, 305 N.W.2d at 80. It 
is not, as suggested by this Court, a justification for the 
initial intrusion. Jd. Were it otherwise, law enforcement 
officials could arguably use the plain view exception to 
"bootstrap themselves into an exploratory search until they find 
what they are looking for." Harris, 671 P.2d at 181. The Harris 
court further stressed that "'[ajny evidence will be in plain 
view, at least at the moment of seizure.'" JEci. But, the "'plain 
view' doctrine comes into play only where the observation made is 
postintrusive. Preintrusive observations merely give rise to 
probable cause." Id. 
Thus, based on the foregoing analysis, the plain view 
doctrine has no application in this case, nor was it properly 
applied in Holmes, for its most basic requirement cannot be met 
in either case. Specifically, the presence of law enforcement 
officers on the public highways outside the legitimately stopped 
vehicles in Holmes, as well as this case, simply cannot be 
characterized as an intrusion, lawful or otherwise, into a 
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constitutionally protected area, which intrusion is necessary to 
trigger application of the plain view doctrine. Harris, 671 P.2d 
at 181. Thus, Holmes, because it application of the plain view 
doctrine was incorrect, offers no valid support for this Court's 
application of the plain view doctrine to the facts of this 
case/ 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, this Court should 
modify its opinion and omit the erroneous and superfluous dicta 
contained in footnote 11 thus limiting justification for the 
warrantless search, i.e., entry into defendant's vehicle, solely 
to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the 
fourth amendment. Application of the plain view doctrine in this 
case, as in Holmes, is erroneous and will serve only to confuse 
law enforcement looking to this Court for guidance as to 
permissible conduct in this sensitive area of the law. 
The State certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. , 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / ffoay of December, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
M I^AITDECKER ^ 
Ass i s tan t Attorney General 
4
 The Court's erroneous reasoning in Holmes is perhaps 
best explained by the fact that Holmes argued the application of 
the plain view exception in her brief to this Court, asserting 
that the contraband there was unlawfully seized pursuant to the 
plain view exception because it was not clearly incriminating (a 
copy of Holme's brief on appeal is attached as Addendum C). 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Jay Fitt, attorney for appellant, 835 East 1400 
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Attorneys: Jay Fitt, Orem, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Russon. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Defendant Foster Leonard appeals from his conviction for 
possession of equipment with intent to manufacture a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, 
§ 58-37C-8 (1990), and for conspiracy to manufacture a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-4-201 (1990) and 58-37-8 (1990). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
From approximately May 1, 1989, to when the present facts 
occurred, law enforcement agencies had been conducting 
surveillance at Intertech Chemical in Orem, Utah. The 
surveillance had resulted in several arrests and convictions 
relating to the possession and manufacture of controlled 
substances, specifically methamphetamine. On July 20, 1989, 
Police Officer Terry Fox was conducting surveillance at 
Intertech. He noticed defendant and April Garza in the parking 
lot. Both were dressed in clothing "not typical of 
business [people],•• and looked nervous. Defendant went into 
Intertech and came out carrying a box of what appeared to be 
glassware and chemicals. Defendant loaded the box into a Ford 
Bronco, and drove away from the parking lot with Garza. Fox 
decided to follow the vehicle in order to identify its owner. 
As Fox proceeded out of the parking lot in his unmarked 
vehicle, a Datsun truck swerved in front of him. Fox testified 
that he thought the driver of the Datsun was trying to block him 
from pursuing defendants vehicle. Fox continued to follow 
defendant, who drove recklessly onto the freeway. Defendant's 
vehicle accelerated to over seventy miles per hour and made 
several illegal lane changes, according to Fox. Fox also 
observed defendant putting bandanna-type flags out both windows 
of the Bronco, apparently to signal the occupants of the Datsun. 
Fox attempted to find out who owned the vehicle he was pursuing, 
but the police dispatcher found no owner registered for the 
license plates on defendant's vehicle. The Datsun similarly had 
no registered owner. 
Fox testified that he decided to stop defendant for the 
traffic violations he had witnessed. Thinking that he might be 
in danger, Fox called for assistance. Three other police 
officers eventually assisted Fox in stopping defendant. One of 
those, Detective Gary Caldwell, learned from Intertech that 
defendant and his companion had purchased glassware and a 
chemical. None of the items purchased were controlled 
substances, but all were commonly used in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine. Caldwell testified that he made the decision to 
stop the vehicle based on his belief that defendant was in 
possession of drug paraphernalia and controlled substances. 
When defendant's vehicle was pulled over, the officers had 
defendant and Garza get out of the vehicle and kneel down on the 
side of the freeway. Under Caldwell's direction, Officer Sean 
Greening placed Garza in his vehicle and asked her name, address, 
and birthdate. Garza produced an Oregon driver's license. 
Greening testified that he also advised Garza she did not have to 
answer his questions. Garza asked why she was being stopped, to 
which Greening replied "for possession of drug paraphernalia." 
Garza then explained to Greening that someone had paid her and 
defendant to purchase the items, and that they were to deliver 
the items to a motel room. 
Meanwhile, Caldwell asked defendant for a driver's license 
and vehicle registration. Defendant had no identification and 
told Caldwell the vehicle belonged to Garza. Defendant then gave 
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Caldwell the name "Scott Leonard" and a birthdate which was later 
determined to be false• Caldwell testified he advised defendant 
of his constitutional rights and defendant consented to answering 
some questions. Caldwell then proceeded to question defendant as 
to what he was doing in Utah County. Defendant told Caldwell 
that he had come to Utah County to purchase the items for 
someone, and that he could not tell Caldwell who that was, 
because defendant would get in trouble. Caldwell also testified 
that he could see a box in the back of the Bronco, and that the 
box contained the items Intertech had told him defendant had 
purchased. 
Because the stories given by defendant and Garza were 
different, and because he knew what items defendant had purchased 
at Intertech, Caldwell arrested defendant and Garza. Defendant 
and Garza were transported to the American Fork Police Department 
and both were questioned by Caldwell. Eventually Caldwell 
determined the exact address of the apartment which defendant and 
Garza shared, and a search warrant of the premises was obtained, 
based on Caldwell's affidavit. 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in the 
warrantless search of the Bronco and in the warrant search of his 
apartment, claiming that the officers did not have probable cause 
to initiate the stop of his vehicle. The trial court denied his 
motion. Defendant then entered a conditional plea of guilty 
pursuant to this court's decision in State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 93 5, 
938 (Utah App. 1988), and this appeal followed. 
Before this court, defendant appeals the denial of his 
motion to suppress, claiming that the evidence was illegally 
obtained. Specifically, defendant claims that his arrest was not 
based on probable cause; that the search of the Bronco was not 
based on probable cause; and that the search of his residence was 
tainted by the illegality of the arrest. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Our review of findings of fact underlying a trial court's 
decision on a motion to suppress is governed by the "clearly 
erroneous" standard, State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 133, 133 (Utah 
App. 1991), because the trial court is in an advantageous 
position to determine the factual basis underlying such a motion. 
"The trial court's finding is clearly erroneous only if it is 
against the clear weight of the evidence . . . ." State v. Serv, 
758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah App. 1988). 
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LEGALITY OF THE INITIAL STOP 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires that all seizures of an individual be based on probable 
cause.1 The United States Supreme Court first explicitly 
permitted a seizure of an individual upon less than probable 
cause in Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). The 
Terrv Court held that a police officer must be able to point to 
"specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion." 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. The reasonable 
suspicion standard is codified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 
(1990): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
"Stressing that each case must be decided upon its own facts, the 
Terrv court concluded that the limited stop and frisk was 
justified where *a police officer observes unusual conduct which 
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his [or her] 
experience that criminal activity is afoot . . • .'" State v. 
Serv, 758 P.2d 938, 941 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting Terrv. 392 U.S. 
at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884). Thus, a temporary detention or 
seizure is justified when there is an articulable suspicion that 
1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, with our emphasis: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
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an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime.2 See 
id. (quoting Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S. Ct. 
1319, 1324 (1983) (plurality opinion)). This court has further 
refined the Terry reasonable suspicion test, concluding that a 
"brief investigatory stop must be based on xobjective facts' that 
the * individual is involved in criminal activity.'" State v. 
Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
The State argues that several facts support the conclusion 
that the officers in the present case had a reasonable suspicion 
that criminal activity was afoot, and that therefore the stop of 
defendant was justified. Intertech had been under surveillance 
for selling drug paraphernalia; defendant's behavior was 
suspiciously inconsistent with that of a legitimate businessman; 
defendant purchased several items from Intertech which are 
commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine; defendant 
2. Of course, no suspicion is required when a police officer 
merely makes an inquiry of an individual in the context of a 
wholly voluntary encounter. The Utah Supreme Court has 
determined that there are three levels of police-citizen 
encounters, each of which requires a different degree of 
justification to be constitutionally permissible: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the 
officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) 
(quoting United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 
1984)). "The stopping of a vehicle and the consequent detention 
of its occupants constitute a level two xseizure' within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment, even if the purpose of the stop 
is limited and the resulting detention brief." State v. Steward, 
806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988)). In our case, it is not disputed 
that a level two stop occurred. 
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left Intertech in an unregistered vehicle; some person in a 
Datsun tried to prevent the officers from pursuing defendant; 
defendant displayed bandannas from the windows of his vehicle in 
an apparent attempt to signal the occupants of the Datsun; and 
defendant drove erratically and illegally on the freeway, 
apparently engaging in evasive tactics.3 
We agree that there was an articulable suspicion which 
justified the stop of defendant's vehicle, and that therefore the 
level two seizure of defendant was reasonable.4 While defendant 
contends that the officers had no evidence that a crime had been 
committed, we note that the officers were not only entitled, but 
probably required, to obtain more information when they 
reasonably suspected a crime had been committed. See State v. 
Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971, 
98 S. Ct. 523 (1977); Holmes. 774 P.2d at 508. We hold, 
therefore, that defendant was constitutionally stopped and 
briefly detained, and that the trial court's determination that 
the requisite reasonable suspicion existed was not clearly 
erroneous. 
ARREST OF DEFENDANT AND SEARCH OF VEHICLE 
Having determined that the initial seizure of defendant was 
lawful, we must determine if the subsequent arrest and search 
were lawful. Defendant argues that the police officers lacked 
probable cause to arrest him, or to conduct a warrantless search 
of the vehicle in which he was riding. The trial court found 
that the arrest of defendant was based on probable cause because 
the chemicals and equipment found in the vehicle were commonly 
3. The State also lists as support for the contention that the 
stop of defendant was based on a reasonable suspicion, several 
facts which occurred after defendant had been stopped. Of 
course, only facts known to the officers at the time they stopped 
defendants vehicle are relevant. See State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 
1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988). See also State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 
181, 183 (Utah 1987). 
4. While Fox testified that he originally planned to stop 
defendant for traffic violations, it is clear from the record that 
Caldwell, who took charge of the situation once he was contacted by 
Fox, stopped defendant's vehicle for the purpose of ascertaining 
who defendant was, and for what purpose the glassware and chemicals 
had been purchased from Intertech. 
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used together in the manufacture of methamphetamine, and because 
testimony revealed that only one specialized piece of glassware 
and some chemicals were lacking to make the illegal substance. 
As to the search of defendant's vehicle,5 the trial court found 
that there was probable cause based on the list of items 
purchased from Intertech received while the officers were in 
pursuit, the suspicious behavior of defendant, and "all attendant 
circumstances."6 However, the court's ruling does not indicate 
which exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment it was relying upon in justifying the warrantless 
search. 
The Arrest 
As to the legality of the arrest, Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 
(1990) provides authority for peace officers to make an arrest 
with or without a warrant. Reasonable cause for arrest without a 
warrant was defined by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259 (1972): "The 
determination should be made on an objective standard: whether 
5. We refer to the vehicle which defendant was driving as 
"defendant's vehicle," but we note that the vehicle actually 
belonged to passenger Garza. 
6. The State does not argue that defendant, because he was not 
the owner of the vehicle, has no standing to challenge the search 
of the vehicle. Therefore, we do not reach the question of 
whether defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
vehicle. 
Prior to State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), our 
supreme court never required the issue of standing to be raised 
by the parties in the trial court or on appeal. "Standing is an 
issue that a court can raise sua sponte at any time." State v. 
Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, U.S. 
, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990). Rather, that court reached the 
issue regardless of whether or not a party had raised it. See 
State v. Constantino. 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987) (per 
curiam); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984); State 
v, Purcell. 586 P.2d 441, 443 (Utah 1978). In Schlosser. 
however, the court held that standing to challenge the validity 
of a search is not a jurisdictional doctrine, and, as such, that 
issue is waived if not raised before the trial court by the 
parties. Schlosser. 774 P.2d at 1138-39. But see Schlosser, 791 
P.2d at 1139-41 (Howe, J., dissenting) (two justices would sua 
sponte raise issue of standing). 
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from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences which 
fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person 
in his position would be justified in believing that the suspect 
had committed the offense." Id. at 1260 (citations omitted). 
See also State v. Avala. 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
The arresting officer, Caldwell, testified that he 
questioned defendant regarding his presence in Utah County and 
the purchase from Intertech. Only after defendant gave a false 
name and birthdate, could provide no plausible explanation for 
the purchase, and would not tell Caldwell who had paid him to 
make the purchase, did Caldwell effectuate an arrest. 
These facts, taken together with the evasive tactics engaged 
in by defendant when the officers were pursuing him, the fact 
that the officers knew exactly what defendant had purchased from 
Intertech based on the list of items received while in pursuit, 
and the fact that the items found in defendant's vehicle were 
commonly used together in the manufacture of methamphetamine, 
warranted arresting defendant. Accordingly, we cannot say that 
the trial court's finding of probable cause was an erroneous one. 
The dissent takes issue with the tactics employed by the 
officers in effectuating a level two stop, concluding that a de 
facto arrest actually occurred. Admittedly, if defendant had 
been arrested immediately upon being stopped by the officers, 
probable cause would have to be established at that point, and 
not after Caldwell interviewed defendant. While many courts have 
addressed the issue of when a seizure occurs,7 the cases are less 
clear on when an arrest occurs. The United States Supreme Court 
has acknowledged that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish an 
investigative stop from a de facto arrest. See United States v. 
Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985). There 
7. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of 
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen 
may we conclude that a seizure has occurred. Terrv v. Ohio, 3 92 
U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968). See also Immigration and 
Naturalization Serv. v. Delaado. 466 U.S. 210, 216-17, 104 S. Ct. 
1758, 1763 (1984) (intimidating circumstances surrounding police 
questioning result in Fourth Amendment seizure); United states v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980) 
(person is seized when, "in view of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed 
that he was not free to leave"). 
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is no "litmus-paper test for . . . determining when a seizure 
exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop[,]H Florida v. Rover. 
460 U.S. 491, 506, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1329 (1983), and becomes an 
arrest. Rather, the determination usually depends upon the 
reasonableness of the stop under the circumstances. Two factors, 
whether there was a proper basis for the stop, and whether the 
degree of intrusion was reasonably related to the facts and 
circumstances at hand, are determinative of reasonableness. 
Terrv. 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79; United States v. 
Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 356 (6th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479 
U.S. 1097, 107 S. Ct. 1318 (1987). While the dissent does not 
dispute there was a reasonable basis for the stop, it does take 
issue with tactics employed by the officers. In reaching our 
conclusion that a proper level two stop was effectuated in this 
case, a review of cases which have addressed this question is 
useful to illustrate that no arrest took place. 
The dissent is correct in acknowledging one exception to the 
general proscription against intrusive police conduct: police 
are permitted to use a show of force or other exceptional methods 
during a Terry stop when such measures are reasonably necessary 
for the protection and safety of the investigating officers. The 
mere use or display of force in making a stop will not 
necessarily convert a stop into an arrest. United States v. 
Greene, 783 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 
1185, 106 S. Ct. 2923 (1986); United States v. White. 648 F.2d 
29, 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied. 454 U.S. 924, 102 S. Ct. 424 
(1981). See also Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 
1921, 1923 (1972) (police officers making a reasonable 
investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity to 
protect themselves from possible attack); United States v. Lego, 
855 F.2d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 1988) (officer can point a gun at 
suspect without transforming investigative stop into arrest); 
United States v. Trullo. 809 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir.) (because 
"officer suspected appellant of dealing in narcotics, a pattern 
of criminal conduct rife with deadly weapons," display of weapon 
justified), cert, denied. 482 U.S. 916, 107 S. Ct. 3191 (1987); 
United States v. Eisenbura. 807 F.2d 1446, 1451 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(experienced police officers acted reasonably in drawing weapons 
in investigative stop of suspected narcotics dealer). 
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We recognize that the officers' conduct, ordering defendant 
to kneel at the side of the road, was intrusive.8 If weapons 
were drawn, the conduct is even more intrusi ^.^ Certainly such 
conduct would not be warranted if the surrounding circumstances 
did not give rise to a justifiable fear for personal safety. 
United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 1986). 
However in this case, there was justification. While the dissent 
acknowledges that certain situations merit officers approaching a 
suspect with their weapons drawn, or ordering a suspect to lie on 
the ground, the dissent argues that in this case, such actions 
were not warranted because the police never determined whether 
defendant had a weapon, and there was no indication that 
defendant was dangerous. However, that conclusion is based on 
faulty assumptions. 
8. Focusing on whether or not requiring a driver to step out of 
his or her vehicle exceeds the scope of a Terry stop, the Supreme 
Court has concluded that '• [w]hat is at most a mere inconvenience 
cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the 
officer's safety." Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S. 
Ct. 330 (1977). See also United States v. Leao. 855 F.2d 542, 
545 (8th Cir. 1988) (officer's confining suspect in police car 
within scope of investigative stop); United States v. Manbeck, 
744 F.2d 360, 377-78 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding reasonableness of 
investigative stop where police ordered the suspect to take a 
seat in the police car), cert, denied. 469 U.S. 1217, 105 S. Ct. 
1197 (1985). Also, as the dissent points out, police may require 
a suspect to lie on the ground. See, e.g.. United States v. 
Buffincrton. 815 F.2d 1292, 1300 (9th Cir. 1987). 
9. There is nothing in the record that supports the dissent's 
conclusion that defendant was not violent or armed. In fact, 
quite the opposite can be assumed given the facts recited above. 
On similar facts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it 
was reasonable to assume that a suspected narcotics dealer was 
armed and dangerous. United States v. Salas. 879 F.2d 530, 535 
(9th Cir.) (erratic and evasive driving by defendants and reports 
of drug materials in defendants' motel room gave police 
reasonable suspicion that defendants were armed), cert, denied, 
493 U.S. 979, 110 S. Ct. 507 (1989); see also United States v. 
Post, 607 F.2d 347, 851 (9th Cir. 1979) (,f[i]t is not 
unreasonable to assume that a dealer in narcotics might be 
armed"). 
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First, the record does not indicate whether or not defendant 
was frisked. Two of the officers who testified gave different 
accounts of what transpired after defendant's vehicle was 
stopped. 
Second, the record does indicate that the officers thought 
defendant was dangerous and could be carrying a weapon. Officer 
Fox testified that he became fearful when bandannas were put 
outside the windows of defendant's car. He decided to call for 
back-up officers to stop defendant's car when the bandannas 
appeared, and when he saw the cream-colored Datsun following him. 
"I felt it was a chase car, an assistance car," Fox testified, 
"and I was again fearful that I needed to have enough help to 
stop this vehicle so I wouldn't get hurt." In addition, Fox 
stated that when he sees an unregistered vehicle, he immediately 
gives it more caution. Officer Greening, who also testified at 
the suppression hearing, stated that he was called to assist in a 
stop for drug paraphernalia, and that he has been informed in 
past circumstances that "these people could be dangerous, and 
thats why [he] was there to assist." Greening went on to say 
that officers, including himself, were often called to assist on 
DUI's and regular traffic stops, and "whenever an officer may 
feel he is in danger," and that it was his belief in dealing with 
people who were involved with drugs that "[t]hey have been 
convicted criminals and in the possession of firearms." We find 
abundant support in the record that the officers believed 
defendant could be armed or dangerous, and not, as the dissent 
suggests, that the police had nothing more than a hunch that 
defendant might be dangerous. Therefore, the officers' actions 
were not unreasonable to insure their safety. 
The dissent points to defendant being read his Miranda 
rights as further indication that an arrest took place. In 
Berkemer v. McCartv, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984), the 
Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings were not required when a 
defendant is subjected to questioning during a routine traffic 
stop. The Court pointed to the circumstances around a traffic 
stop and compared them to stationhouse interrogation, "which 
frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware 
that questioning will continue until he provides his 
interrogators the answers they seek." Id. at 448, 104 S. Ct. at 
3149 (citations omitted)• Given that traffic stops occur in 
public, and that they are relatively brief, the Court concluded 
that "persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not 
*in custody' for the purposes of Miranda." Id. at 440, 104 S. 
Ct. at 3150. The Court, however, also noted that police "could 
ensure compliance with the law by giving the full Miranda 
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warnings." Id. at 431 n.13, 104 S. Ct at 3145-46 n.13.10 That 
is exactly what took place here. 
In the present case, defendant was detained briefly on the 
side of the highway. The officers interrogated defendant. 
Defendant was arrested after he gave the officers false 
information, and had no plausible explanation for the Intertech 
purchase. Given the circumstances facing the officers, we 
conclude that they pursued their investigation in a diligent and 
reasonable manner, and that the methods employed were not 
excessive. 
The Search 
Admittedly, the search of defendant's vehicle conducted 
without a warrant is unreasonable per se unless it falls within a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. 
Bartlev. 784 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah App. 1989). The State, 
acknowledging that the trial court did not rely upon a specific 
exception, claims that the search was justified pursuant to the 
automobile exception. 
While an individual has a lesser expectation of privacy in a 
vehicle as opposed to in his or her home, the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment still applies. See State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 
1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citing California v. Carney. 471 U.S. 
390-93, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068-70 (1985)). In Carroll v. United 
States. 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925), the Supreme Court 
determined that a warrantless search of an automobile was 
10. In United States v. Bautista. 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982), 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that while officers are 
not required to give Miranda warnings every time they question a 
suspect, "Miranda warnings are necessary even during a Terrv stop 
if the suspect has been taken into custody or if the questioning 
takes place in a police dominated or compelling atmosphere.11 Id. 
at 1291 (citing United States v. Wilson. 666 F.2d 1241, 1247 (9th 
Cir. 1982); United States v. Harris. 611 F.2d 170, 172 (6th Cir. 
1979)); United States v. Hickman. 523 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir. 
1975), cert, denied. 423 U.S. 1050, 96 S. Ct. 778 (1976). 
Compare United States v. Baron. 860 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(police exceeded scope of investigative stop by ordering 
defendant not to touch anything or say anything, and thirty-five 
minutes later confined her to a small room for questioning), 
cert, denied. 490 U.S. 1040, 109 S. Ct. 1944 (1989). 
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permissible if the officers have probable cause to believe the 
automobile contains either contraband or evidence of a crime and 
that they may be lost if not immediately seized. Ici. at 151-52; 
see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07, 102 S. Ct. 
2157 (1982); Chambers v. Maronev. 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 
1978-80 (1970); United States v. Mendoza. 722 F.2d 96, 100 (5th 
Cir. 1983); State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Dronebura, 781 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Carroll. 
267 U.S. at 132); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 512 n.6 (Utah 
App. 1989). Thus, where as here, a vehicle is lawfully stopped 
based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, a 
warrantless search is justified where the officers have probable 
cause to believe contraband is contained in the vehicle. 
"The determination of whether probable cause exists . . • 
depends upon an examination of all the information available to 
the searching officer in light of the circumstances as they 
existed at the time the search was made." State v. Dorsev. 731 
P.2d at 1088 (citing Brineaar v. United States. 338 U.S. 160, 
176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (1949)). Probable cause for a 
warrantless search has been found to exist on facts similar to 
those in the present case. In Mendoja, drug enforcement agents 
conducted surveillance of a residence, and also followed 
individuals who had contact with the suspect who resided there. 
The agents observed several of these individuals driving "in a 
manner calculated to elude surveillance," Mendoza, 722 F.2d at 
101, using pay telephones, and making several trips to and from a 
warehouse. While the court said that these facts may be 
consistent with innocent behavior, the totality of the 
circumstances justified a warrantless search of the suspects' 
vehicles. Id. at 101-02. 
Similarly, in Dorsev, our supreme court upheld a warrantless 
search of an automobile where a police officer who was assisting 
other officers involved in an undercover narcotics purchase, 
followed defendant's truck and eventually stopped him. The court 
found that because the officer knew that a controlled narcotics 
purchase had been attempted; that two of the individuals had left 
the motel room where the negotiations were taking place; that 
someone involved in the transaction had on a dark leather jacket; 
and that defendant was wearing a dark leather jacket, probable 
cause existed. Dorsev, 731 P.2d at 1089. 
Reviewing all of the information available to the officers 
in the present case, we hold that there was probable cause to 
justify the search. Officers Caldwell and Fox both testified 
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that they observed drug paraphernalia and chemicals in plain view 
in the vehicle.11 The officers also testified that defendant 
could not explain why he purchased the items, or for whom they 
were purchased. While the officers' information at the time of 
the search might not be sufficient by itself to establish guilt, 
it was sufficient to establish probable cause. See id. 
Therefore, the trial court's determination that probable cause 
existed for the search was not erroneous. 
VALIDITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT 
Defendant's last claim is that the affidavit in support of 
the warrant to search his apartment contained nothing from which 
a detached and neutral magistrate could conclude that the 
apartment contained evidence of a crime. It is well established 
that a finding of "probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation" is required for the issuance of a search warrant. 
State v. Brown. 798 P.2d 284, 285 (Utah App. 1990) (citation 
11. This testimony raises an interesting question in that none 
of the officers testified that they actually conducted a search 
of defendcint's vehicle, only that they had seen the box 
containing the Intertech purchase on the back seat. Although not 
briefed or raised by the State, a second exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is the plain view exception. 
Determining whether the plain view exception applies requires 
application of a three-pronged test: (1) the officer's presence 
must be lawful; (2) the evidence must be in plain view; and (3) 
the evidence must clearly be incriminating. State v. Holmes, 774 
P.2d 506, 510 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
It is clear that in the present case, the officers' presence 
was lawful. We have already established there was reasonable 
suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle. It is also clear from the 
record that the box containing the glassware and chemicals was 
clearly visible in the back seat of the vehicle. As for the 
third prong, "clearly incriminating" has been defined as 
"probable cause to associate the property with criminal 
activity." State v. Kellv, 718 P.2d 385, 390 (Utah 1986) 
(quoting Texas v. Brown. 460 U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 
1543 (1983) (plurality opinion)). In this case, there is 
evidence to suggest that the contents of the box were associated 
with criminal activity because all of the items purchased are 
used in the manufacture of illegal substances, and are rarely 
purchased in combination for any other purpose. Thus, all of the 
requirements for the plain view exception are satisfied. 
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omitted). In reviewing a probable cause determination, a 
magistrate's decision will be upheld if "the magistrate had a 
substantial basis for . . . [determining] that probable cause 
existed," State v, Babbell. 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989) 
(quoting Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S. Ct. 
2317, 2332 (1983)). 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the affidavit in this 
case is sufficient. Taken as a whole, the affidavit establishes 
that the affiant relied on his own and upon Fox's investigation 
and observations of defendant's conduct; that defendant had 
purchased several items which were known to be used in the 
manufacture of methamphetamine; that defendant gave false 
information as to where he resided, and when questioned about the 
Intertech purchase; and that Garza, with whom defendant shared 
the apartment, and who was arrested at the same time based upon 
the same facts as defendant, had previously been convicted for 
conspiracy to manufacture and distribute illegal substances. See 
State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989) (probable 
cause determination supported by fact that defendant has 
previously been convicted of similar offense), cert, denied, 795 
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). These facts, taken together, support the 
trial court's determination that probable cause existed for the 
issuance of the search warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
We hold that the stop and subsequent warrantless search of 
defendant's vehicle, defendant's arrest, and the warrant search 
of defendant's home did not violate his rights, and therefore, 
the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion to suppress 
the evidence found as a result of those searches was not clearly 
erroneous. The conviction is affirmed. 
RUSSON, Judge (concurring in the result): 
I concur in the result of the main opinion, but write 
separately because I prefer a different analytical approach to 
reach the same result. I would hold that probable cause to 
arrest Leonard existed at the time at which the officers stopped 
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Leonard's vehicle. The facts which support probable cause 
include: (1) evidence that the continuing surveillance had 
resulted in several arrests and convictions relating to the 
possession and manufacture of methamphetamine; (2) Officer Fox's 
observation that Leonard's dress and manner were suspiciously 
inconsistent with those of a legimate businessman; (3) the Datsun 
truck's attempt to block Officer Fox from following Leonard; 
(4) Leonard's evasive driving manner, including driving at 
excessive speeds and making numerous illegal lane changes; 
(5) Leonard's apparent attempt to signal the occupants of the 
Datsun truck by waving bandanna-type flags out the window; 
(6) Officer Fox's discovery that no owner was registered for the 
license plates on the vehicle that Leonard was driving; and 
(7) the fact that Officer Caldwell had learned from Intertech 
what items had been purchased by Leonard and his companion, in 
concert with Officer Caldwell's knowledge that the said items are 
commonly used in the manufacture of methampetamine. On the basis 
of these facts, I would hold that the officers had probable cause 
to arrest Leonard when they stopped his vehicle, and that 
therefore the trial court properly denied Leonard's motion to 
suppress. Accordingly, I agree that Leonard's conviction should 
be affirmed. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
ORMEr Judge (dissenting): 
In its brief, the State does not contend that there was 
probable cause to arrest defendant or subject him to anything 
more intrusive than a level-two Terry stop at the time the police 
officers effected the stop and asked their initial questions. 
Accordingly, the debate on appeal was principally directed to 
whether the police officers possessed the articulable suspicion 
necessary to justify a level-two encounter. I agree the officers 
had the requisite articulable suspicion to warrant a level-two 
stop. It does not follow, however, that what the officers 
actually effected was a proper level-two stop. Given the 
intrusive tactics employed by the investigating officers, I 
believe the main opinion errs in determining that the initial 
seizure was a level-two stop and not a de facto arrest requiring 
probable cause. 
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According to the record, the police officers stopped 
defendant because they suspected him of committing a non-violent 
felony—possession of equipment used in the manufacture of 
controlled substances. There were four police officers present, 
and three police cars, while only defendant and his female 
companion occupied the stopped vehicle. The stop occurred along 
the shoulder of a well-traveled highway, apparently during 
daylight.1 At no time prior to the stop had the officers seen 
defendant or his companion in possession of a weapon, and the 
record provides no indication that the police had anything more 
than a pre-stop hunch that defendant might be dangerous. When 
defendant's vehicle came to a halt on the shoulder of the 
highway, defendant voluntarily exited the vehicle and walked 
toward the police cars. There is no evidence that defendant made 
furtive gestures, carried himself suspiciously, or otherwise 
approached the police in anything but a cooperative, non-violent 
manner.2 
Nonetheless, Officer Fox testified that before questioning 
defendant, he ordered defendant to kneel down at the side of the 
highway. The female occupant of defendant's vehicle was placed 
in one of the police cars. Further, although neither Officer Fox 
nor Officer Caldwell recalled specifically whether any of the 
police officers drew their guns at the time they made the stop, 
Officer Fox claimed it was "very possible" guns were drawn, and 
Officer Caldwell stated that he "hoped" at least one of the 
officers had drawn his gun. Finally, Officer Fox testified that 
before questioning defendant, Officer Caldwell advised defendant 
of his Miranda rights. 
A Terrv stop "involves no more than a brief stop, 
interrogation, and, under the proper circumstances, a brief check 
for weapons." United States v. Robertson. 833 F.2d 777, 780 (9th 
1. Although the record does not state the time of the stop, 
other facts—i.e., that, just prior to the stop, officers had 
been conducting surveillance at a wholesale establishment open 
for business, and that officers clearly saw bandannas being waved 
from defendant's vehicle—indicate that the stop took place 
during daylight hours. 
2. It would thus appear that any pre-stop concern the officers 
had about the potential dangerousness of defendant would have 
been largely dispelled by his non-confrontational approach. Any 
lingering concern could have been dispelled by a simple pat down 
of the sort permitted by Terry. 
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Cir. 1987). Anything beyond such a brief and narrowly-defined 
intrusion constitutes a de facto arrest, and probable cause is 
required. See id.; Dunaway v. New York. 442 U.S. 200, 99 
S. Ct. 2248, 2254 (1979). The accepted rule is that what might 
have otherwise been a level-two stop evolves into a level-three 
de facto arrest when, in view of all the circumstances, a 
reasonable, innocent person in the suspects place would believe 
himself to be under arrest. See United States v. Pinion, 8 00 
F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 936, 107 S. 
Ct. 1580 (1987). See also Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 502, 
103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326-27 (1983) (characterizing relevant inquiry 
as whether the suspect believed he was being detained). 
Accordingly, in the course of a valid Terry stop the police may 
not, as a matter of routine, utilize methods which might commonly 
be employed incident to arrest. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 9.2(d) at 366 (2d ed. 1987). 
There is, however, one exception to this general 
proscription against intrusive police conduct. Police are 
permitted to employ a show of force or other exceptional methods 
during a Terrv stop when such measures are reasonably necessary 
for the protection and safety of the investigating officers.3 
3. For situations in which police officers may draw weapons 
while effecting a stop, see, e.g.. United States v. Jones, 759 
F.2d 633, 638-39 (8th Cir.) (drawing weapons is permissible part 
of vehicle stop "if the police action is reasonable under the 
circumstances," taking into consideration "the number of officers 
and police cars involved, the nature of the crime and whether 
there is reason to believe the suspect might be armed, the 
strength of the officers' articulable, objective suspicions, the 
erratic behavior of or suspicious movements by the persons under 
observation, and the need for immediate action by the 
officers . . . . " ) , cert, denied. 474 U.S. 837, 106 S. Ct. 113 
(1985); United States v. Narcri. 732 F.2d 1102, 1106 (2d Cir. 
1984) (display of weapons does not transform stop into arrest 
when suspected crime is a serious felony and stop was made in an 
isolated area); United States v. Jacobs. 715 F.2d 1343, 1345-46 
(9th Cir. 1983) (drawing weapon acceptable when vehicle's 
occupant is suspected of bank robbery and is possibly under the 
influence of drugs, and the police officer is alone). 
For situations in which police officers may require a 
suspect to lay down on the ground, see, e.g.. United States v. 
Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (when suspect ran 
toward apartment for which police had a warrant to search for 
guns and drugs, and suspect put his hand into his pants, it was 
acceptable for police to force suspect to lie on the floor), 
cert, denied. 110 S. Ct. 1790 (1990); United States v. Tavlor, 
(continued...) 
900560-CA 18 
However, even then, the investigating officers must employ the 
least intrusive means reasonably available to effect the purpose 
of the stop. See Royer, 103 S. Ct. at 1325 (recognizing that, 
although permissible level of intrusion will vary with 
circumstances, least intrusive means must always be employed). 
I agree that, in the instant case, the State has set forth 
sufficient facts to support a finding that the police had 
reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and make a level-two 
inquiry. However, given the circumstances of the encounter, I do 
not believe those same facts support a finding that the intrusive 
methods used by the police were necessary to protect the officers 
during the stop.4 The State has provided no additional evidence 
to justify the officers' conduct.5 Therefore, on the record 
before us, I believe the seizure to have been too intrusive to 
qualify as a level-two stop.6 
3 (...continued) 
716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1983) (stop not invalid because 
police ordered suspect to lie on the floor, when suspect had 
disobeyed police commands to raise his hands and had made furtive 
gestures); People v. Chestnut. 51 N.Y.2d 14, 409 N.E.2d 958, 962, 
431 N.Y.S.2d 485 (ordering suspect to the floor was permissible 
when suspect was in company of man whom there was probable cause 
to arrest for an armed robbery that had just been committed, and 
police had witnessed a suspicious exchange between that man and 
the suspect), cert, denied. 449 U.S. 1018, 101 S. Ct. 582 (1980). 
4. The officers did not frisk defendant, or otherwise attempt 
to discern if he was carrying a weapon. This strongly suggests 
that, once defendant had been stopped and exited his car, the 
officers did not suspect he was armed. Robertson. 833 F.2d at 
781. Other circumstances of the stop—the highway-side locale, 
the presence of four officers, the non-violent nature of the 
suspected offense, and defendant's non-furtive attempt to 
approach the police vehicles—also indicate the situation was not 
potentially dangerous, and that intrusive tactics were 
inappropriate. 
5. The problem may essentially be a failure by the State, at the 
trial court, to develop the available evidence so as to meet its 
burden of proof. Little attention seems to have been given at 
the evidentiary hearing to what the police did in effecting the 
stop as opposed to what they knew in deciding to effect the stop. 
6. Nonetheless, I might still be willing to view the facts as 
not moving the case from the level-two to the level-three 
pigeonhole if, at the time the seizure occurred, a reasonable, 
(continued...) 
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It is the State's burden to show that the seizure it seeks 
to justify was sufficiently limited to satisfy the conditions of 
a level-two stop. United States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 781 
(8th Cir. 1983) (quoting Rover. 103 S. Ct. at 1325-26). See 
United States v. Al-Azzawy. 784 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1985), 
cert, denied. 476 U.S. 1144, 106 S. Ct. 2255 (1986). For the 
reasons discussed above, I believe the State falls short of 
satisfying that burden. See also note 4, supra. Accordingly, I 
would hold that the district court erred in determining defendant 
6(...continued) 
innocent person in defendant's place would not have believed 
himself to be under arrest. See United States v. Pinion. 800 
F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 936, 107 S. 
Ct. 1580 (1987). I find such a possibility unlikely here. The 
police converged on defendant in three separate cars. The 
initial confrontation was somewhat hostile despite defendant's 
passivity, and may well have included a show of weapons by one or 
more officers. Defendant was ordered to his knees at the side of 
the highway, while his female companion was placed in the back of 
a police vehicle. Defendant was then informed of his Miranda 
rights. It is unlikely that, at this point in the encounter, a 
reasonable person in defendant's position would believe his 
seizure to be less than a level-three custodial one. Other cases 
have reached the same result in similar circumstances. See, 
e.g. , United States v. Delqadillo-Velascruez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1295 
(9th Cir. 1988) (Terrv-stop of suspected drug dealers held 
invalid when police approached with guns drawn, ordered the 
suspects to lie down in the street, and handcuffed them, since 
the "show of force and detention used in this context are 
indistinguishable from police conduct in an arrest"); Kraus v. 
County of Pierce, 793 F.2d 1105, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1986) (under 
circumstances in which police turned spotlights on the suspects, 
drew their weapons, and ordered the suspects to drop to their 
knees, a reasonable person would have believed himself to be 
under arrest), cert, denied. 480 U.S. 932, 107 S. Ct. 1571 
(1987). 
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was subjected to a valid level-two stop, reverse the denial of 
defendant's suppression motion,7 and remand with instructions to 
permit withdrawal of his guilty plea. 
Gregory^R. Orme, Judge 
7. The evidence seized from the car and from defendant's home is 
tainted by the illegality of his "arrest" on less than probable 
cause. Probable cause came into existence only when defendant 
made incriminating statements when in custody, but such custody 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
FOSTER M. LEONARD, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 900560-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of 
equipment with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 
(Supp. 1991), and for conspiracy to manufacture a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-4-201 (1990) and 58-37-8 (Supp. 1991). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence on the 
grounds that the investigatory stop of defendants' vehicle was 
supported by reasonable suspicion, that the subsequent search of 
defendants' vehicle was proper, that officers provided 
appropriate Miranda warnings prior to questioning defendants and 
that the affidavit in support of a search warrant for defendants' 
residence was sufficient to establish probable cause. Because 
the trial court is in the best position to assess witness 
credibility in a motion to suppress hearing, this Court "will not 
disturb its factual assessment underlying a decision to . . . 
deny a suppression motion unless it clearly appears that the 
lower court was in error," State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 285 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)- A trial court's findings are not clearly 
erroneous unless they are either against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or this Court reaches a "definite and firm conviction" 
that the trial court was mistaken. State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 
539 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted); State v. Ashe, 745 
P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). However, this Court reviews 
conclusions drawn from the trial court's fact findings as a 
matter of law, giving no deference to the lower court's ruling. 
State v. Caver, No. 900297-CA, slip op. at 7 (Utah Ct. App. June 
25, 1991). 
When a search warrant is challenged as having been 
issued without an adequate showing of probable cause, the 
reviewing court does not conduct a de novo review of the 
magistrate's probable cause determination; instead, the reviewing 
court determines only whether the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for concluding that probable cause existed. State v. 
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989). The reviewing court 
should pay "great deference" to the magistrate's decision. Ibid. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Foster M. Leonard, was charged with two 
counts of possession of a controlled substance, to wit, ephedrine 
and hydriodic acid, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37c-4(b) (Supp. 1991); possession of equipment 
with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 (Supp. 1991); 
conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance, to wit, 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37-8 (Supp. 1991) and 76-4-201 (1990) and giving false 
information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (Supp. 1991) (Record 
[hereinafter R.] at 12-13). 
Following the trial court's denial of his motions to 
suppress evidence, defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty 
to the charges of possession of equipment with intent to 
manufacture a controlled substance and conspiracy to manufacture 
a controlled substance, as third degree felonies, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 (Supp. 1991) and Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-
37-8 (Supp. 1991) and 76-4-201 (1990) (R. at 44, 51, 65, 113-21 
(motions to suppress), 151-58 (statement of defendant), 108-12 
(trial court's ruling)). 
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Defendant was subsequently sentenced to not more than 
five years on each count and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine on each 
count, sentences to run concurrently (R. at 189-87). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
For purposes of the issues raised on appeal, the 
pertinent facts are those set out in the trial court's ruling (R. 
at 108-112).x The Court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law are as follows: 
[1] From approximately May 1, 1989, law 
enforcement agencies had been conducting 
surveillance at Intertech Chemical in Orem[,] 
Utah. The surveillance has resulted in a 
number of arrests and convictions. On July 
20, 1989, Detective Terry Fox was conducting 
surveillance at Intertech. He noticed 
defendant Leonard in the parking lot wearing 
casual clothes and using what appeared to be 
a personal vehicle rather than a company 
vehicle. Leonard behaved in a nervous 
manner. He purchased what looked to the 
detective to be glassware and chemicals and 
appeared to pay in cash. Defendants loaded 
the glassware and chemicals in to the vehicle 
and left the parking lot. 
[2] Detective Fox decided to follow the 
vehicle in order to identify its owner. As 
Fox attempted to follow the vehicle, another 
car swerved in front of Fox in an apparent 
attempt to disrupt his progress. It appeared 
to Fox that the defendants' vehicle was 
trying to evade pursuit. Fox noted reckless 
behavior on the part of the defendants as 
they turned to get on the freeway that nearly 
caused an accident. On the freeway, the 
defendants' accelerated to over 70 miles per 
hour in a 55 miles per hour zone. 
1
 Defendant does not appear to dispute the trial court's 
findings; rather, defendant challenges the credibility of the 
officers who testified at the motion to suppress hearing (Br. of 
App. at 5-6). 
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[3] Detective Fox called for back up after a 
check through dispatch found no owner 
registered for either the plates of the 
defendants' vehicle nor for the vehicle that 
swerved in front of him. The vehicle was 
stopped without incident after the backup 
arrived,2 The officers on the scene then 
arrested the defendants and gave the 
appropriate Miranda warnings. Defendants 
were interviewed separately concerning what 
they had purchased and the purpose for which 
they had purchased it. They gave the 
officers different stories—but both 
indicated that they were purchasing the 
equipment for someone else. Defendant 
Leonard at first gave a false identification 
and date of birth. Over $2,000 was found in 
defendant Garza's purse. 
[4] Prior to the arrest of the defendants 
and the search of the vehicle, the officers 
had made contact with Intertech and were told 
what the defendants had purchased*3 The 
items found in the vehicle—including 
glassware and chemicals—matched the 
description of the merchandise given by 
Intertech. The vehicle contained items 
frequently used in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine. Defendant Garza gave two 
different addresses as her own. After 
checking with Mountain Bell, the officers 
found that one of the addresses given had a 
phone listed in her name. Based upon the 
information given above, a search warrant was 
2
 Based on information provided him by Officer Fox, Officer 
Gary Caldwell of the American Fork Police Department effected the 
stop of the defendants' vehicle (T. at 82-90). The stop was 
based on the officers' belief that defendants were in possession 
of drug paraphernalia, as well as controlled substances (T. at 
53, 56-58, 61, 89-90). 
3
 Although the trial court correctly found that Intertech 
was contacted prior to defendant's arrest, a review of Officer 
Caldwell's testimony at the suppression hearing makes clear that 
the arresting officers received the Intertech information even 
prior to the stop of defendants' vehicle (T. at 33). In 
addition, Officer Caldwell learned that defendants paid cash and 
did not provide Intertech with their names at the time of 
purchase (R. at 7, para. #8; a copy of Officer's Caldwell's 
affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum A)• 
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served on defendant Garza's residence. 
Numerous "listed" chemicals and drug 
paraphernalia were found. 
[5] The Court finds that the stop made by 
the officers was appropriate and legal. 
Detective Fox had reasonable suspicion based 
on the circumstances taken as a whole. The 
defendants did not appear to be ordinary 
businessmen; they appeared to be nervous; 
they drove erratically, they used what 
appeared to be a personal vehicle; another 
car seemed to be acting in concert with 
defendants in an attempt to block the 
detective's pursuit; dispatch could not 
identify owner of the vehicle from the 
license plate number; the defendants were 
traveling more than 15 miles per hour in 
excess of the speed limit; the list of items 
purchased given to the officers while in 
pursuit were indicative of illegal activity. 
All of these factors taken together could 
easily create a reasonable and articulateble 
[sic] suspicion necessary to make an 
investigatory stop. 
[6] Defendants were properly given their 
Miranda warnings. Even before the officers 
began investigatory questioning which does 
not require it, defendants were given Miranda 
warnings. Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 
1168, 1170 (1983). 
[7] The Court believes the search of the 
defendant's vehicle was proper. The list of 
items purchased from Intertech received while 
the officers were in pursuit, combined with 
the suspicious behavior of the defendants, 
and all attendant circumstances, created 
probable cause for [the] search of the 
vehicle. Even if the search was improper, 
the illegality would not affect the legality 
of the search warrant. The reasoning of the 
Court is that information relative to the 
evidence found in the vehicle was available 
to the officers in the form of a purchase 
order from Intertech. 
[8] The chemicals and equipment found in the 
defendants' vehicle and on the purchase order 
from Intertech were commonly used together in 
the making of methamphetamine. In fact 
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testimony indicated that the materials found 
lacked only one specialized piece of 
glassware and some other chemicals to allow 
one to easily make methamphetamine. Also, 
such equipment is rarely used in conjunction 
to make anything other than methamphetamine. 
The officers, being aware of the facts above, 
had probable cause to make the arrest. 
[9] The Court believes that there was 
sufficient probable cause for the issuance of 
the search warrant based on the conduct of 
the defendants and the purchase order from 
Intertech. This probable cause was enhanced 
by the statements of the defendants relative 
to the intended use of the supplies obtained 
from Intertech and the false information 
given relative to living quarters and 
identity. 
[10] For the reasons given above, the Court 
finds that the stop of the defendants' 
vehicle, the subsequent questioning of the 
defendants, and the issuance of the search 
warrant were proper. Therefore, the Court 
denies defendants['] motion to suppress. 
(R. at 108-12). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's arguments in points I-III of his brief 
appear to focus on the trial court's assessment of reasonable 
suspicion for the initial stop of defendant's Bronco (Br. of App. 
at 10-13). Specifically, defendant broadly asserts that the 
stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and therefore the 
subsequent arrest, seizure of contraband, investigatory 
questioning and warrant-based search of his residence were all 
impermissibly tainted (Br. of App. at 10-13). Defendant's 
unsubstantiated and erroneous allegations lack merit as well as 
record support. 
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The stop of defendant's vehicle was supported by a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity• Prior to 
the stop, investigating officers had observed defendant's and his 
companion's suspicious conduct, including the cash purchase of 
glassware and chemicals commonly used in the illegal manufacture 
of methamphetamine, as well as defendants' evasive and reckless 
driving. Notwithstanding the above, defendant challenges the 
subsequent search of the Bronco and police questioning solely on 
the alleged illegality of the initial stop. However, because the 
initial stop of defendant's vehicle was valid as based on 
reasonable suspicion, defendant's arguments are all equally 
without merit. 
As for defendant's allegations concerning the 
sufficiency of Officer Caldwell's affidavit, a review of the 
record supports the magistrate's finding of probable cause for 
the issuance of the search warrant. Contrary to defendant's 
assertion, the affidavit clearly identified the "source" of 
Officer Caldwell's information which included his and other 
officers' observations of defendant in possession of drug 
paraphernalia. Moreover, because a police officer is generally 
presumed to be reliable, no special showing of the officers' 




THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED BY POLICE 
WAS PROPER. 
In point I of his brief on appeal, defendant challenges 
the trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion in 
support of the investigatory stop of defendant's vehicle (Br, of 
App. at 5). Specifically, defendant asserts that the trial court 
erred in relying on the testimony of the officers in assessing 
the facts in support of its determination of reasonable suspicion 
for the stop (Br. of App. at 6-7, 10). Defendant further alleges 
that certain of the trial court's findings were erroneous, and 
that viewing the facts individually, they fail to support the 
trial court's ruling (Br. of App. at 6-9). Defendant's 
unsubstantiated and erroneous allegations are without merit. 
Due to the trial court's "advantageous position in 
determining the factual basis for a motion to suppress," as well 
as to "observe witnesses' demeanor and other factors bearing on 
credibility," this Court will not upset a trial court's 
underlying factual findings unless they appear to be clearly 
erroneous. State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (citations omitted); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 
(Utah 1987). A trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous 
unless they are either against the clear weight of the evidence, 
or this Court reaches a "definite and firm conviction" that the 
trial court was mistaken. .Id., (citations omitted). Accordingly, 
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this Court may not disturb the trial court's determination that 
reasonable suspicion existed unless that factual finding is 
clearly erroneous. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 
1987); (Utah 1987); State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 137 n.l (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). But see State v. Carter, No. 900303-CA, slip op. at 
n.6 (Utah Ct. App. May 28, 1991) (amended opinion) (noting the 
Court's confusion on the proper standard of review - i.e., 
whether to treat the trial court's determination of the existence 
of reasonable suspicion as a question of fact or a conclusion of 
law)/ 
The "reasonable suspicion" test was first articulated 
by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968). There the Court held that when "a police officer 
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude 
in light of his experience that criminal activity is afoot," he 
may make an investigative stop to confirm or dispel his 
A
 The State acknowledges that Utah is in the minority with 
Mendoza's requirement that the reasonable suspicion determination 
be reviewed as a finding of fact under a clearly erroneous 
standard. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez - Alvarado, 891 
F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989) (setting forth the generally held 
view that whether reasonable suspicion exists is a mixed question 
of fact and law, and the trial court's ultimate conclusion 
regarding reasonable suspicion is a legal conclusion which is 
reviewed do novo). In Carter the State plans to seek certiorari 
review by the Utah Supreme Court and to ask that court for 
clarification of the standard of review for reasonable suspicion 
determinations. However, unless and until the Utah Supreme Court 
disavows Mendoza, that decision and its clearly erroneous 
standard of review are binding on this Court. 
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suspicion. Ld. at 30.5 A police officer who makes an 
investigative stop must be able to point to "specific and 
articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Ld. at 21. 
The Terry "reasonable suspicion" test has been codified in Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) which reads as follows: 
Any peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address, and an explanation of his actions. 
This Court has interpreted the reasonable suspicion 
test and concluded that a "brief investigatory stop must be based 
on 'objective facts' that the 'individual is involved in criminal 
activity.'" State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (citations omitted); Menke, 787 P.2d at 541. 
5
 This Court has previously noted that there are three 
constitutionally permissible levels of police encounters: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd 
on other grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). 
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The undisputed testimony of the officers at the motion 
to suppress hearing established that members of the North End 
Narcotics Strike Team were conducting an ongoing investigation 
into the establishment and operation of methamphetamine 
laboratories (T. at 9-13, 27, 46, 64-65)• As part of that 
investigation, Officer Fox was conducting a visual surveillance 
of Intertech Trading in Orem, Utah on July 20, 1989 when he 
observed defendant and codefendant, April Garza, purchase 
glassware and chemicals (T. at 10-12, 32). Officer Fox believed 
defendant's behavior was suspiciously inconsistent with the 
actions of a legitimate businessman for several reasons, 
including defendant's casual dress and the absence of a company 
logo on the Bronco, as well as defendant's continuous scanning of 
the parking lot before lifting up the front of his shirt and 
reaching down his pants to remove something (T. at 10-12, 27-29). 
While Officer Fox watched, boxes depicting glass flasks (which 
appeared to be the same size and shape as glassware boxes Officer 
Fox had observed during previous investigations), as well as 
gallon containers of some type of chemical, were loaded into the 
back of the Bronco (T. at 11-13). 
As the Bronco, driven by defendant, pulled out of the 
Intertech parking lot, Officer Fox attempted to get the license 
plate number of the vehicle (T. at 13). As he attempted to 
follow defendant's Bronco, Officer Fox was intercepted by a cream 
colored Datsun parked against traffic on the wrong side of the 
road (T. at 13). After forcing Officer Fox to brake in order to 
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avoid hitting it, the Datsun fell in behind the Bronco, in front 
of Officer Fox's vehicle (T. at 14). Upon reaching the 1-15 
northbound on-ramp, Officer Fox observed the Bronco fail to yield 
the right of way to another vehicle, forcing the other vehicle 
off the road into the barrow pit (T. at 14). At the same time, 
the Datsun slammed on its brakes and began weaving an S-pattern 
in front of Officer Fox's vehicle (T. at 14). As he continued 
following the Bronco northbound on 1-15, Officer Fox observed 
several additional evasive tactics by defendant including 
speeding and illegal lane changes (T. at 15-17). He also 
observed defendant apparently attempt to signal the Datsun by 
putting bandanna-type flags out both windows of the Bronco (T. at 
16). A subsequent registration check on both the Bronco and 
Datsun prior to the stop revealed that neither set of plates were 
"on file" (T. at 15). 
Officer Caldwell, who had been called for back-up 
assistance, then contacted Intertech in an effort to determine 
what defendant and his companion had purchased (T. at 33, 96). 
Intertech informed Officer Caldwell what they had purchased, that 
they paid cash and that they had not given their names at the 
time of purchase (R. at 7, para. #8; see Addendum A). Based on 
information received from Intertech, as well as the personal 
observations of Officer Fox and defendant's reckless, evasive 
driving, Officer Caldwell stopped defendant's vehicle (T. at 35-
38, 53, 61, 66). As he approached to talk to defendant, Officer 
Caldwell observed heating panels, heating units, glassware, 
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stirring rods, boxes of rubber gloves and color blast testing 
strips in plain view in the Bronco (T. at 69). Due to his 
experience in the investigation of controlled substances and 
their manufacture, Officer Caldwell was able to identify these 
objects as the type commonly used in the unlawful manufacture of 
methamphetamine (T. at 69-71). 
Based on the foregoing, the stop of defendant's Bronco 
was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. As 
has been recognized by this Court, trained police officers "may 
be able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which 
would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer. . . . " 
Menke, 787 P.2d at 541. Thus, an officer is "entitled to assess 
the facts in light of his experience." .Id. (citations omitted). 
Moreover, contrary to defendant's apparent assertion, an 
officer's assessment of reasonable suspicion depends not on 
isolated facts, but upon the totality of the circumstances. 
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Because the investigating officers in this case were able to 
articulate their suspicions and identify the facts upon which 
they were based, and because those suspicions were justified by 
the totality of the circumstances confronting the officers, this 
Court should affirm that the stop of defendant's vehicle was 
lawful. The court's reasonable suspicion determination was not 
clearly erroneous. Id. 
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POINT II 
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS PROPER 
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
As previously noted, defendant's arguments in points 
II-III concerning the subsequent search of the Bronco and police 
questioning, appear to be nothing more than an extenuation of his 
argument in point I, without sufficient factual development (Br, 
of App. at 10-11). Defendant appears to assert that the officers 
lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant 
and his companion were engaged in illegal activity prior to 
stopping the Bronco; therefore, the subsequent vehicle search, as 
well as police questioning, were allegedly invalid and any 
contraband seized, or information gained therefrom, should be 
suppressed pursuant to Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 
(1963). As before, defendant's broad and unsubstantiated 
allegations are without merit. 
The trial court found that there was probable cause for 
the search of defendant's Bronco. Specifically, the Court 
stated: 
The Court believes the search of the 
defendants' vehicle was proper. The list of 
items purchased from Intertech received while 
the officers were in pursuit, combined with 
the suspicious behavior of the defendants, 
and all attendant circumstances, created 
probable cause for [sic] search of the 
vehicle. 
(R. at 111, para. # 7 ) . Although the trial court determined that 
the search of defendant's vehicle was supported by probable 
cause, the court's ruling does not expressly state which 
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exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment it 
was applying. Admittedly, a search and seizure conducted without 
a warrant is unreasonable per se unless it falls within a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. 
Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation 
omitted); Menke, 787 P.2d at 543. However, the search of 
defendant's vehicle was justified under the automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement first articulated in Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 151-52 (1925). The Carroll Court 
determined that a warrantless search of an automobile was 
permissable if the searching officers "have probable cause to 
believe that the automobile contains either contraband or 
evidence of a crime and that they may be lost if not immediately 
seized." State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (quoting State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 
1984)). See Chambers v. Maronev, 399 U.S. 42 (1975). See also 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); United States v. Ross, 
456 U.S. 798 (1982); State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 
(Utah 1986).6 Thus, where as here, a vehicle is lawfully 
stopped based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and 
6
 Because defendant has neither raised nor requested a 
separate state constitutional analysis under article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution, the State's argument is based solely 
on the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and 
thus; does not address the plurality opinion in State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) which held that under article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution, warrantless searches are permissible 
"only where they satisfy their traditional justification, namely, 
to protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent the 
destruction of evidence." Id. at 469-70. 
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officers observe contraband which may be lost if not immediately 
seized, the Carroll doctrine would justify an immediate and 
warrantless search. State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 
1978). See Christensen, 676 P.2d at 411. See also State v. 
Hvqh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985). 
Reviewing all the information available to the officers 
in light of the circumstances as they existed at the time of the 
search, the evidence shows that the officers had ample 
information available to establish probable cause that there was 
contraband in the vehicle and to justify an immediate warrantless 
search of the Bronco. 
Officers Caldwell and Fox testified that they observed 
drug paraphernalia and chemicals in plain view in the back of 
defendant's Bronco at the time of the stop (T. at 19, 69). 
Specifically, Officer Fox testified that he observed gallon 
containers and glass flasks of chemical in an open box in the 
back of the Bronco (T. at 19). Officer Caldwell testified that 
he observed glassware, heating panels and units, stirring rods, 
color blast testing strips and rubber gloves (T. at 69). These 
observations, together with the suspicious behavior of defendant 
and his companion at the time they purchased the glassware and 
chemicals, the information from Intertech concerning the 
purchased items, as well as defendant's evasive and reckless 
driving prior to the stop, all support the trial court's apparent 
determination that there was probable cause to associate the drug 
paraphernalia and chemicals observed in the Bronco with the 
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suspected illegal manufacture of methamphetamine. See Menke, 7 87 
P.2d at 544 (contraband seized was the anticipated fruit of the 
suspected theft). Thus, in summary, defendant was lawfully 
stopped and investigated, probable cause existed for the search 
of the Bronco, and the warrantless search was justified under the 
automobile exception. Therefore, the trial court did not err in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress and this Court should 
affirm the lower court's ruling on this ground. See State v. 
Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) (Court may affirm trial 
court's decision to admit evidence on any proper ground). 
As for defendant's allegation in point III, he vaguely 
asserts that information obtained through police questioning was 
tainted and therefore "inadmissable" because it followed the 
alleged illegal stop of defendant's Bronco (Br. of App. at 11). 
Significantly, defendant does not attack the trial court's 
findings in regard to the propriety of police questioning 
following his arrest. The trial court specifically held that 
[t]he officers on the scene [] arrested the 
defendants and gave the appropriate Miranda 
warnings. Defendants were interviewed 
separately concerning what they had purchased 
and the purpose for which they had purchased 
it. They gave the officers different 
stories—but both indicated that they were 
purchasing the equipment for someone else. 
. . . 
Defendants were properly given their 
Miranda warnings. Even before the officers 
began investigatory questioning which does 
not require it, defendants were given Miranda 
warnings. 
(R. at 109, 111, supra pp. 5-7 para. ## 3, 6). 
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As previously noted in point 1, it is the State's 
position that the stop of defendant's Bronco was valid pursuant 
to the officers' reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; thus, 
subsequent events were not tainted thereby. Because defendant 
has not presented additional argument, legal analysis, authority 
or record support for his allegations, the State will not further 
address defendant's argument on this point. Moreover, 
defendant's minimal and conclusory analysis does not merit review 
by this Court. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 
1984); State v. Sterqer, 808 P.2d 122, 125 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (court declined to rule on defendant's arguments due in 
part to his failure to provide any meaningful analysis). 
POINT III 
THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH 
WARRANT WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE 
CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S 
RESIDENCE. 
In point IV of his brief defendant appears to assert 
that Officer Caldwell's affidavit in support of a search warrant 
for defendant's residence was insufficient to establish probable 
cause (Br. of App. at 11-12). Specifically, defendant asserts 
that •• [n]othing contained in either the affidavit or in the 
transcript of the hearing reveals any claim to a source, whether 
confidential or otherwise, which claims to have seen any 
contraband or other evidence of criminal conduct" (Br. of App. at 
13). Defendant's meritless allegations are unsupported by the 
record• 
-19-
It is well established that a finding of "probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation" is required for the 
issuance of a search warrant. State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 285 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted). It is equally clear 
that whether an affidavit in support of a search warrant 
established probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant 
is determined by the totality of the circumstances. State v. 
Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 
1258 (Utah 1983) (adopting Gates analysis)), cert, denied, 773 
P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). In determining whether the issuing 
magistrate reached a practical, common sense decision that there 
is "probable cause to believe that evidence is located in a 
particular place," the reviewing court does not conduct a "de 
novo probable-cause determination;" rather, the reviewing court 
determines whether the evidence viewed as a whole" provides a 
"'substantial basis' for the finding of probable cause." Ld. at 
1109-10 (citing Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732-733 
(1984)); Brown, 798 P.2d at 286 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987), and State v. 
Dronebura, 781 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). In so 
determining, the reviewing court should pay "great deference to 
the magistrate's decision." State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 
(Utah 1989). A review of Officer Caldwell's affidavit 
accordingly reveals a "substantial basis" for the magistrate's 
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determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search 
warrant for defendant's residence. 
As previously noted, defendant's primary challenge to 
the affidavit appears to be that it failed to identify a "source" 
for the information contained therein (Br. of App. at 13). 
However, contrary to defendant's assertion, the "source" of 
Officer Caldwell's information was clearly stated in the 
affidavit (R. at 70-72, see Addendum A). Specifically, Officer 
Caldwell relied upon his own and Officer Fox's investigation and 
observations of defendant's conduct (R. at 70-72, see Addendum 
A). 7 As set forth in the affidavit, Officer Fox observed 
defendant and his companion load drug paraphernalia into their 
vehicle at Intertech (R. at 72, see Addendum A). He then relayed 
that information to Officer Caldwell in a request for backup 
assistance, who then contacted Intertech to find out what 
defendant had purchased (R. at 71-72, see Addendum A). Based on 
the information he received from Intertech, as well as 
defendant's reckless and evasive driving, Officer Caldwell 
determined that defendants had purchased prohibited drug 
paraphernalia with the intent to manufacture the controlled 
substances (R. at 71, see Addendum A). 
7
 Because a police officer is generally presumed to be 
reliable, no special showing of either Officer Caldwell's or 
Officer Fox's reliability is required here. 3 W. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 3.5(a), p. 3 (1987) (citing United States v. 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965)). Cf. State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 
1363, 1366 (Utah Ct. App.) (average neighbor witness is not the 
type of informant in need of independent proof of reliability or 
veracity) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 
1987). 
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As further stated in his affidavit, Officer Caldwell 
subsequently interviewed both defendant and his companion and 
received conflicting stories concerning an individual who 
allegedly asked them to purchase the paraphernalia on his behalf 
(R. at 70-71, see Addendum A)• Officer Caldwell also ran a 
criminal history on codefendant Garza and learned that she had 
previously been arrested for conspiracy to manufacture 
methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute and possess 
methamphetamine. See State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah 
Ct. App.) (probable cause determination supported by information 
that defendant had previously been convicted of a similar 
offense), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Based on the 
foregoing information, Officer Caldwell determined that defendant 
and his companion were "not being honest" with him and that, 
contrary to their assertions, they were in fact themselves 
manufacturing and distributing methamphetamine in their residence 
and that a search of that residence would reveal additional 
paraphernalia (R. at 70, see Addendum A). Thus, contrary to 
defendant's assertion, Officer Caldwell's affidavit provided a 
substantial basis for the magistrate's determination of probable 
cause to believe that contraband would be discovered inside 
defendant's residence. Therefore, this Court should affirm the 




Based on the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial 
court denying defendant's motion to suppress should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j[p day of July, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General / 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A 
CIRCUIT CPMST, AMERICAN FORK DEPART."~*IT 
OTAH COU17TY, STATE OF DTAH 
************************************************************* 
PROBAELE CAUSE 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF AND MOTION FOR A 
SEARCH WARRANT 
CASE NO. 
************************ *************«*>************* ******* 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH j 
1. Gary Caldwell
 f being first duly sworn on 
oath/ deposes and says; 
2. That I am a police officer for American Fork Police 
Departr.entf American Forkf Utah, Utah Countyf State 
of Ut;h. 
3. That I have been a police officer for the past ten years. 
I have been working with a narcotics task force as a 
supervisor for the past two years. I have experience in 
serving as many as 100 search warrants during the past eight 
years. I have arrested many people for narcotics violations 
during the same period of time 
4. I have been to narcotics training classes during the past 
two years to train me in working with different types of 
narcotics cases. One of the classes dealt with methamphetimines 
and how people operate labs. I have been trained in all 
aspects of the operation of and the way people operate in 
order to set a lab up. 
5. In the past three months I have had experience in arresting 
as many as twelve persons who have been involved in manufacturing 
methamphetimine labs. I have found and located meth labs 
in houses and vehicles. I have seen the equipment used and 
the method of operation. 
6. On July 20th, 1989 at 1400 hours, Lt. Fox of the American 
Fork Police Department observed a blue 1980 Bronco with Utah 
Plates # 023 DAD pick up items from Intertech Trading in 
Orem, Utah at 170 South Mtn. Way Dr. The itmes he could see 
being loaded appeared to be paraphrenlia items used in a 
methamphetimine* lab. Lt. Fox contacted your affiant at the 
American Fork Police Dept. and told me what he had seen. He 
was asked to follow the vehicle until I could determine who 
the person picking the itmes up was. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
- v s -
OCCUPANTS OF • 56&Q Soti^h 
1291 East 
Mu; 
I was able to determine that the items picked up were items 
listed on the House Bill # 3 as paraphrenlia items. I believe 
that based on the actions of the two suspects in the vehicle 
and the items purchased by cash from Intertech Trading that 
the two persons knew that the items were going or were probably 
going to a meth lab. 
The actions were that the two suspects hid the itmes in the 
rear of the vehicle they were driving. They did not gine any 
names at the time of purchase. They picked up items listed 
on House Bill #3 and other items we believe are used to manu 
facture meth. They had some one other than the registered 
owner drive the vehicle. 
At approximately 1400 hours, your affiant stopped the suspect 
vehicle and advised the driver of his rights. He told your affiar 
that he was paid to come to Orem by a man he knows as "Fatso" 
and pick up the paraphrenlia items. He told me that he 
was to take the items to Salt Lake Cith to a motel, rent a 
room and call the guy at a pay phone booth and he would come 
pick up the chemicals and glass ware, he told me that he was 
given $540.00 cash to pay for the items. 
Your affiant interviewed the female suspect at the American 
Fork Police Department and she told your affiant that she 
met a man in a business in Salt Lake City two months ago. 
She told me that the man she knows as Mike Shriver is 
from California and he gave-her $2,000.00 in cash to go to 
Orem to pick the chemicals and paraphrenlia items up. She 
said they were to take the items to Salt Lake to a Motel 
and rent it for three days and put the key on top of the 
pay phone outside.The suspect was to call her at her house 
and she would tell him where the key was and he would pick 
the items up. 
Your affiant believes that there is probable cause to believe 
that both suspects were in possession of drug paraphrenlia 
with intent to manufacture Methamphetamines. Your affiant 
ran a criminal history on April Garza and found that 
she has been in prison in California and possible Oregon. I 
found that she had family in Oregon. I learned that she has 
been arrested for Conspiracy to Manufacture Methamphetamines 
Conspracy to Dist. and Poss Methamphetamines . She also 
has a arrest for assault on a police officer with a firearm. 
Your affiant interviewed April and Leonard, the two suspects 
and both of them gave your affiant an address in Salt Lake 
City. April gave your affiant this address also and said she 
lived here too. I asked her which address she really lived at 
and she gave me the 5600 South 1291 East #6. I was able to 
have her give me her phone number. She stated the number was 
the number registered to the stated address. I called Mary 
at Mtn. Bell and she told me that the phone number given to 
your affiant was registered to April at 5600 South 1291 East 
#6 in MurrayfUtah 
7 
13- Your affiant sent Det. Blackhurst and Det. Taylor from Orem 
Police to Murray: to the stated address, and they located 
a 280 Z car which is registered to April. The car is parked 
right in front of the stated residence. Your affiant was 
told by Blackhurst that the mail box in front ofthe residence 
had the name of April and Leonard on it. 
14. Your affiant believes that the two listed suspects have not 
been honest with me and that they in fact may the ones 
making or manufacturing or distributing methamphetannines. That 
they in fact live at the stated address at 5600 South 1291 East 
#6. 
15. Your affiant believes that the two suspects are or may be 
in possession of controlled substances in the residence which 
have been manufactured by glass ware and items the same as 
we seized. Your affiant believes that the two suspects will 
be in possession of items used to distribute or manufacture 
controlled substances, and that they will be in possession 
of items used to identify them and their sources for the 
sale or distribution of controlled substances. 
16. Your affiant believes that because of the evidence found 
already and the criminal history of April and because of 
the type of items involved in the use and manufacturing of 
methamphetimines that there is a serious danger to the officers 
serving the search warrant. April is not in the house, but 
in the Utah County Jail, however, anyone could be in the stated 
residence. 
17. Therefore, Your affiant respectfully request a warrant to 
search the stated residence and to enter the residence without 
first giving notice of our presence and intent to enter. 
Jl/-M^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS ^O DAY OF JULY 1989. 
TIME: iS'-lif 
CIRCUIT .fibtfltt JUDGE ~~ 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the officers' detention of Ms. Holmes violate the 
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution? 
2. Did the officers1 detention of Ms. Holmes violate 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution? 
3. Even if the officers lawfully stopped the vehicle in 
which Ms. Holmes was a passenger, did they nevertheless violate the 
fourth amendment in seizing the roll of paper towels and its 
contents since the facts did not fit within the plain view exception? 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
vi. 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) provides: 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop 
and question suspect — Grounds. A peace 
officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing 
or is attempting to commit a public offense and 
may demand his name, address and an explanation 
of his actions. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code 
Ann.§78-2a-3(2) (f), whereby the defendant in a district court 
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final judgment of conviction for any crime other than a first degree 
or capital felony. 
vii. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH/ : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : 
vs. : 
CHARLENE ANN HOLMES : Case No. 880168-CA 
Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ^  
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Attempted Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance/ a class A 
misdemeanor/ in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8 (1953 as amended). The 
judge found Ms. Holmes guilty on January 15, 1988/ on the basis of 
evidence received during a hearing on a Motion to Suppress Evidence 
held November 20/ 1987/ in the Third Judicial District Court/ in and 
for the Salt Lake County# State of Utah/ the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, presiding. See Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of September 17/ 1987/ Lieutenant William 
Gray and Sergeant William A. Shelton of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department were on a plainclothes assignment patrolling in an 
unmarked police car (T 26). 
At approximately 8:30 p.m., Sgt. Shelton and Lt. Gray 
first noted a woman as she stood on the sidewalk on the west side of 
1200 South State Street talking to the male occupant of a pickup 
truck. Officers Gray and Shelton, in their unmarked car, pulled in 
behind the truck which then drove away. The woman, whom the 
officers later learned was Charlene Ann Holmes, proceeded to walk 
southbound (T. 5, 26-27). 
As Ms. Holmes continued walking south, Officers Gray and 
Shelton observed a car pull into the Veterinary Hospital parking 
lot, stopping at the entrance crossing the sidewalk. Ms. Holmes 
turned and talked to the driver. After a short conversation, the 
car departed and Ms. Holmes continued walking south before crossing 
the street at the southwest corner of 1300 South and State Street. 
She proceeded to walk south to a service station, Wayne's Car Care 
Center (T. 6-7, 27). 
At Wayne's Car Care Center, the officers observed a male 
in a small pickup truck stop and briefly converse with Ms. Holmes. 
Ms. Holmes then walked south and as she neared the southern end of 
the service station, the second of the three cars which the officers 
had earlier seen stop Ms. Holmes pulled into the station. The 
driver again conversed with Ms. Holmes and shortly thereafter she 
got into the car (T. 7-8). 
The officers followed the car as it headed southbound on 
State Street. At 1700 South, the car turned east and entered the 
west parking lot at South High School. The car exited only seconds 
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later on to 1700 South and proceeded eastbound to 300 East, entering 
the east parking lot at South High School. The car emerged moments 
later and returned to 1700 South. Driving westbound, the car turned 
at 200 East, made a U-turn and reentered 1700 South westbound to 
State Street. The car then turned north onto State Street (T. 9-10, 
28-29). 
At approximately 1500 South and State Street, Lt. Gray 
and Sgt. Shelton pulled the car over. Prior to stopping the car, 
neither officer had viewed Ms. Holmes engage in any illegal activity 
nor did they observe the driver of the car violate any traffic 
ordinances (T. 10, 29). 
Sgt. Shelton testified that he and Lieutenant Gray 
stopped the car because they figured that a prostitution deal had 
been made between the driver of the car and Ms. Holmes. Sergeant 
Shelton speculated that the deal had been made, but that the 
occupants of the car had discovered that he and Lt. Gray were police 
officers and were thus returning to State Street to drop off Ms. 
Holmes (T. 10,29). 
Sgt. Shelton, as head of the vice squad, had had no 
previous contacts with Ms. Holmes and had no information that she 
was a prostitute (T. 17). He testified that his belief that a 
prostitution deal had been made was based on his observations that 
there is a very high area of prostitution between approximately 800 
South and 2100 South on State Street (T. 5-6), that Ms* Holmes 
strolled at a very low pace, turning back and looking toward 
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traffic, that she had brief conversations with three different males 
(T. 21), and, that the route the car had taken was suspicious (T. 
10). 
After stopping the car, Sgt. Shelton approached the 
driver's side of the car and asked the driver to step out and talk 
to him (T. 11). Sergeant Shelton did not take the driver's name, 
nor did he note or record the model and make of the car or its 
license plate number (T. 24). 
Lt. Gray walked up and stood directly behind the car door 
on the passenger side where Ms. Holmes was seated (T. 30). Lt. Gray 
testified that from his vantage point, he witnessed Ms. Holmes 
remove a roll of paper towels from her purse and attempt to stuff 
them between the car console and the seat. Lt. Gray opened the door 
and asked Ms. Holmes for the roll of towels. He reached in and 
removed the towels and unrolled them on the roof of the car. He 
stated the towels contained two syringes, a spoon, and two small 
packets of mayonnaise (T. 30-31). 
Lt. Gray arrested Ms. Holmes for possession of a 
controlled substance (T. 32). The officers released the driver of 
the car. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Ms. Holmes was seized when officers stopped the car in 
which she was a passenger for questioning as to whether she and the 
driver had made a prostitution deal. Because the officers lacked a 
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reasonable suspicion to justify such detention, Ms. Holmes' rights 
under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution were 
violated and the evidence seized should have been suppressed. 
The seizure of Ms. Holmes also violated her rights under 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the statutory 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended). 
Even if the officers lawfully stopped the vehicle in 
which Ms. Holmes was a passenger, the officers nevertheless violated 
the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and 
seizure when they seized a roll of paper towels which were not 
visibly linked to criminal activity, and unrolled them without 
obtaining a warrant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE DETENTION OF MS. HOLMES VIOLATED THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
The Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), referred 
to the Fourth Amendment's personal privacy and security safeguards 
as "sacred," with no right "more carefully guarded, by the common 
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and 
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control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference 
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." 
Id., at 8-9 [quoting Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Botsford, 141 
U.S. 250 (1891)]. The protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment 
extends to this nation's citizens when they are on public sidewalks 
and when they are in their automobiles. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
A limited exception to the general probable cause 
requirement was created by the United States Supreme Court in Terry 
when it held that under appropriate circumstances a brief detention 
of a person, absent probable cause to arrest, is permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment. See also, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 
(1983). The Terry Court instructs that this limited exception is 
tailored to balance the government's interest in effective law 
enforcement against the individual's liberty, privacy and personal 
security. However, in recognizing the essential protections 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has stressed 
that in balancing these competing considerations, a central concern 
has been "to assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of 
privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the 
unfettered discretion of officers in the field." Brown v. Texas, 
443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). 
Thus, in justifying a particular detention, an officer 
must be able to point to specific articulable facts which, when 
viewed under an objective standard, create a reasonable suspicion 
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that the defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491. 
This Court has reiterated the Terry Court's insistence on such a 
standard, cautioning that "[a]nything less would invite intrusions 
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more 
substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has 
consistently refused to sanction. And simple 'good faith on the 
part of the arresting officer is not enough....". State v. 
Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 21-22). This constitutionally mandated "reasonable suspicion" 
necessary to justify detention has been codified in Utah law at 
Section 77-7-15 Utah Code Ann. (1953). Trujillo,, 739 P.2d at 88. 
The search and seizure limitations of the Fourth 
Amendment apply to "investigatory stops" or "seizures" that are less 
than official arrests. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of 
its occupants constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the 
fourth and fourteenth amendments. State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123 
(Utah 1983); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653. Therefore, Defendant Charlene 
Holmes' fourth amendment rights were implicated when Officers Gray 
and Shelton stopped the car in which she was a passenger and 
detained her. In this case, the information relied on by the 
officers in a decision to detain the defendant did not amount to the 
constitutionally mandated reasonable suspicion. 
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It is Sergeant Shelton's testimony that he relied on four 
factors to justify a stop and detention of Charlene Holmes, 
1. The officers observed Ms. Holmes on the block of 1200 
South State Street which, they believed based on their past 
experience, is part of a very high area of prostitution extending 
from approximately 800 South to 2100 South on State Street. 
2. Ms. Holmes strolled at a very slow pace and turned 
back to look toward traffic. 
3. Ms. Holmes had short, brief conversations with three 
different males who were seated in their respective automobiles and 
then got into one of the automobiles. 
4. The "suspicious" route of the car in which Ms. Holmes 
was a passenger. 
It is Sergeant Sheltonfs testimony that he relied on two 
factors to justify the stop and detention of Charlene Holmes. 
(a) Ms. Holmes was in an area frequented by 
prostitutes. 
(b) Ms. Holmes talked briefly to two different males 
in their automobiles on two separate occasions, and she conversed 
briefly with a third male in whose car she was subsequently stopped 
and detained by the officers. 
The factors enumerated by the officers, singly or in 
combination, did not rise to the level indicated in the case law 
from Utah, the United States Supreme Court, and other jurisdictions, 
to justify the detention of Ms. Holmes under the fourth amendment. 
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Factor 1(a). Both officers testified that they took an 
interest in Charlene Holmes because of their belief that the area in 
which they first observed her was a "very high prostitution area." 
Although there has been little opportunity to analyze the 
"high prostitution area" factor in Utah case law, it is most 
analogous to the "high crime area" factor which was recently 
presented to this Court in State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 
1987). In Trujillo, this Court determined that an officer's 
decision to stop the defendant was based initially on two factors, 
one of which was the high crime factor in the area. This Court held 
that the seizure of the defendant was unconstitutional — the 
detention of the defendant being unreasonable within the meaning of 
the fourth amendment. 
In State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), the 
officer cited the "high crime area" factor as one of the bases for 
his suspicion of criminal behavior on the part of the defendants. 
The Utah Supreme Court's per curiam decision did not address the 
issue specifically, but since the Court held that the information 
known to the officer did not justify the stop, it can be inferred 
that the high crime area factor was insufficient to justify the 
challenged stop. See also State v. Belanger, 677 P.2d 781 (Wash. 
App. 1984). 
In State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the 
defendants were seen in a laundromat located in a high crime area at 
1:00 a.m. The officer recognized the defendants from a previous 
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criminal encounter during which a bag of coins was discovered in 
their possession. In this instance, the Court found the initial 
stop leading to the arrest as valid. However, Whittenback is 
readily distinguishable from the case now before the Court since the 
officer had previously apprehended the defendants with a bag of 
coins in their possession and there had been a rash of burglaries in 
the area of the laundromat. 
In the case now before the Court, no such previous 
contact existed. Sergeant Shelton testified that he had not had any 
previous contacts with Ms. Holmes and that as the head of the vice 
squad, he had no information that she was a prostitute (T.17). 
Consequently, there is no relationship established between Ms. 
Holmes1 prior activities and her presence in a "high prostitution 
area." 
In People v. Bower, 24 Cal.3d 638, 645, 597 P.2d 115, 119 
(Cal. 1979), the California Supreme Court in addressing the "high 
crime area" factor recognized that many citizens shop, work, play, 
transact business, visit, or live in areas that have high crime 
rates. The Court noted that p[t]he spectrum of legitimate human 
behavior occurs every day in so-called high crime areas. As a 
result, this court has appraised this factor with caution and has 
been reluctant to conclude that a location's crime rate transforms 
otherwise innocent-appearing circumstances into circumstances 
justifying the seizure of an individual." Ld. (citations 
omitted). The court's critical analysis of the high crime area 
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factor is consistent with the view that the attributes of a general 
social phenomena should not be imputed to an individual. 
in State v. Sery, Case No. 860333-CA, slip op., (July 27, 
1988) this Court analogized Mr. Seryfs arrival from Florida as a 
basis for a reasonable suspicion to the testimony in State v. 
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), that Interstate 15 was often used 
by illegal aliens from Mexico. ]M. at 18. This Court found that 
the fact that a person embarked from a flight which originated in 
Florida did not amount to an objective fact upon which a reasonable 
suspicion could be based just as the fact that a person was 
traveling on 1-15 did not support a reasonable suspicion in 
Mendoza. This Court noted: 
In Mendoza, the court considered it unlikely that 
illegal alien transporters comprised a significant 
portion of 1-15 traffic. It seems equally unlikely that 
drug couriers comprise a significant portion of the 
travelers through Salt Lake International airport, 
even of those whose flight originated in Florida. 
Id. at 18. Applying the analysis of Mendoza and Sery to the instant 
case, it seems just as unlikely that persons who have entered into 
illegal prostitution agreements comprise a significant portion of 
the people on State Street, and information that a woman was walking 
on State Street between 2100 South and 800 South is not a fact upon 
which a constitutionally sound reasonable suspicion that a woman was 
involved in criminal activity could be based. 
In the case before the Court, the defendant, a female, 
was walking down the street in an area deemed by Officers Shelton 
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and Gray to be a "very high prostitution area"; an area, as 
described by the officers, which encompasses approximately fifteen 
city blocks, daily the site of heavy pedestrian and automobile 
traffic. A woman should not be subject to seizure simply because 
she is present in an area which has a high incidence of 
prostitution. That an area has a high occurrence of prostitution 
does not qualify itself as a specific articulable fact imputing a 
reasonable suspicion of criminality to an individual woman. 
Factor 2. Sergeant Shelton alone testified that the 
defendant's walk and accompanying backward glance were significant 
factors in his decision to stop and detain her. The allegedly 
suspicious walk of Ms. Holmes was no more than her walking at a very 
slow pace, or "strolling" and looking back towards traffic — as 
described by Sergeant Shelton. (T.21) 
Although this Court has "acknowledged] that a trained 
law enforcement officer may be able to perceive and articulate 
meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the 
untrained observer," and furthermore, "[t]he officer is entitled to 
assess the facts in light of his experience." Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 
88-89; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564-565 (1980), 
this Court has also re-emphasized that it is "imperative that the 
facts be judged against an objective standard! ]" which would 
•warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the 
action taken was appropriate!.]" Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 88. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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Sergeant Sheltonfs interpretation of Ms. Holmes' walk and 
alleged head movements is purely subjective. There is no objective 
standard which one could possibly utilize to determine whether one 
was strolling, walking at a very slow pace, at just a slow pace, at 
a slow pace, at a medium pace, at a fast pace. Assuming arguendo 
that there is probative value in such a determination, it would fail 
the objective test as enunciated by the Terry Court and followed by 
this Court. 
Indeed, the subjective nature of Sergeant Shelton's 
observation of Ms. Holmes' walk and the conclusions derived 
therefrom, is illustrated by the testimony of his partner that 
evening. Lieutenant Gray stated that although in his opinion she 
walked a little slowly, there was otherwise nothing unusual about 
her walk. The following exchange occurred during cross-examination 
of Lieutenant Gray: 
Q. Did you see her (Ms. Holmes) walk down State Street? 
A. Yes 
Q. Did she walk in a normal fashion? 
A. She walked a little slow, in my opinion, but 
other than that, nothing unusual. 
Q. Okay, no flirting gestures? 
A. Not that I observed. 
(T.35) Lieutenant Gray's opinion that there was nothing unusual 
about Ms. Holmes' walk and his lack of reliance on the manner in 
which Ms.Holmes walked down the street to justify the determination 
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to stop and detain Ms. Holmes is strengthened by his twenty years 
experience in police work. 
The unordinary "pace" and "meaning" of Ms. Holmes' walk 
is entirely subjective and not an objective indication of criminal 
intent to be used to justify police detention. To find otherwise 
could conceivably subject every law-abiding citizen to the 
"unfettered discretion" of law enforcement officials, in violation 
of the fourth amendment. 
Factor 3b. Both officers testified that their interest 
in Ms. Holmes was aroused because they observed her having short, 
brief conversations with three different males seated in their 
respective automobiles and that Ms. Holmes got into one of the 
automobiles. 
Ms. Holmes' "brief conversations" as a basis for the 
formation of an articulable suspicion on the officers' part is 
similarly subject to the objective difficulties discussed above. As 
to these brief conversations, Sergeant Shelton testified that as Ms. 
Holmes walked down the street, three separate cars pulled up 
alongside her and they briefly conversed. Sergeant Shelton 
testified in regard to these conversations that Ms. Holmes did not 
motion to any car or wave the cars over; Ms. Holmes did not yell at 
the cars; nor did they observe Ms. Holmes initiate the 
conversations. (T. 18-20). 
Sergeant Shelton further testified that he could not hear 
anything that was said in the conversations; he did not know the 
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identity of Ms. Holmes or the identity of any of the three different 
drivers; he did not know what occurred in the conversations prior to 
Ms. Holmes1 ride in the car. Jjd. The result is that the officers 
lacked an objective basis to formulate an articulable suspicion 
arising from separate conversations between four unknown 
individuals. According to the officers1 testimony, at no time did 
they possess any knowledge as to the purpose, context, or content of 
the conversations "observed" between Charlene Holmes and the three 
individuals. 
Ms. Holmes was engaged in short conversations with three 
men in cars as she walked down State Street, an occurrence which is 
not at all peculiar as pointed out by Sergeant Shelton during 
cross-examination: 
Q. You [Sergeant Shelton] have driven up and down 
State Street a number of times, I take it? 
A. A lot, yes. 
Q. It is not unusual at all on any night of the 
week to see a young woman talking to other 
people in cars, is it? 
A. No. 
Q. Happens hundreds of times from 3rd South to 21st 
South on State Street every night of the week? 
A. I canft talk about 21st to 3rd. I am not really 
that familiar with that part of the street. That 
is out of my jurisdiction. 
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Q. Well, within your jurisdiction, whatever that is. 
It is the kind of thing that happens hundreds of 
times a night on State Street, does it not? 
A. Yes, it does. 
(T. 20-21) 
Objectively, there is nothing to distinguish the brief 
moments of conversation between the defendant and the three drivers 
from "the kind of thing that happens hundred of times a night on 
State Street." (Jj3.) The fourth amendment acts essentially as a 
standard of "reasonableness" in order to guard "the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions" by government 
officials, including law enforcement agents. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 
653-654. 
In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 52, the Court concluded 
that there were no adequate grounds to form a reasonable suspicion 
that the defendant was engaged in criminal conduct because, "[i]n 
short, the [defendant's] activity was no different from the activity 
of other pedestrians in that neighborhood." I^cJ.; See Trujillo, 739 
P.2d at 90. There was no knowledge provided to the officers from 
Ms. Holmes' alleged conversations by which one could reasonably 
differentiate Ms. Holmes from other pedestrians in the area. 
Evaluated under an objective test, the alleged conversations between 
Ms. Holmes and the three drivers do not give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion. 
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Sergeant Shelton stated that the route taken by the car 
in which Ms. Holmes was a passenger contributed to his decision to 
stop the vehicle and detain the passengers. Sergeant Shelton 
testified that the car's route also included momentarily pulling 
into two different parking lots. Sergeant Shelton further testified 
that he did not observe the car make any traffic violations (T. 
22). On the other hand, Lieutenant Gray's testimony did not specify 
that the route of the automobile in question was relied upon by him 
to justify the stop and detention of Ms. Holmes (T. 29, 36-37). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 
(Utah 1986) was presented with the stop of an automobile in which 
one of the factors claimed to justify the stop and detention was the 
manner in which the car was driven. The officer observed the slow 
moving car, with out-of-state license plates at 3:00 a.m. in an area 
in which a recent rash of burglaries had occurred. The Court's 
analysis took into account the fact that the officer had not 
observed any criminal or traffic offense while he followed the car 
for three blocks. It was the Court's finding that the officer had 
no objective facts on which to base a reasonable suspicion that the 
car's two occupants were involved in criminal activity. 
In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah, 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court directly addressed the "route of travel" factor 
stating that "it had little probative value in determining if the 
officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle." La. at 
4. Furthermore, the Court noted that the "erratic driving behavior" 
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(the subsequent lane change and rapid deceleration at the approach 
of the patrol car) could not be interpreted to give rise to a 
suspicion that the occupants of the car were engaged in illegal 
activity, jr_d. at 4-5. 
In Sery, the Court compared the State's reliance on Mr. 
Sery's behavior in sitting down in a phone booth twice then standing 
up and looking over the partition, and subsequently leaving the 
booth by a "strange" path to the State's reliance on an "erratic" 
driving pattern in Mendoza. Sery, slip. op. at 19. This Court 
determined that Mr. Sery's behavior did not amount to an objective 
fact upon which a reasonable suspicion could be based, pointing out 
that the officer "did not say how this behavior varies from that of 
any other arriving passenger . . .". Id. 
In the present case, the officers observed the car in 
which Ms. Holmes was a passenger in an area of heavy traffic. 
Neither officer observed any criminal behavior before or after the 
car turned from the south bound direction on State Street to the 
north bound direction on State Street when they stopped the car. 
The officers did not articulate any objective facts to support the 
speculation that the manner in which the car was driven served to 
provide a reasonable suspicion that a "prostitution deal" had been 
made between Ms. Holmes and the driver of the car or that the car 
was driven any differently from other cars cruising State Street. In 
fact, Sergeant Shelton testified the he pulled the car over because 
he "figured" that a prostitution deal had been made and that the 
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driver had decided that they were police and he was going to return 
and drop off Ms. Holmes. Sergeant Shelton acknowledged that his 
scenario was conjecture on his part (T. 10). In addition the car 
was unmarked and the officers were in plain clothes suggesting it 
was difficult for the occupants of the car to have known they were 
being followed by officers if, in fact, they realized that they were 
being followed at all.* Furthermore, it is indicative of the nature 
of the stop that the officers released the driver without getting 
his name, the model and make of the car, and the license plate 
number (T. 24). 
The four factors relied upon by the officers to justify 
the stop and detention of Ms. Holmes, when analyzed singly, do not 
constitute specific articulable facts which create a reasonable 
suspicion that a crime had taken place or was about to take place. 
Furthermore, nothing concerning the cumulation of the factors makes 
them more persuasive in support of a conclusion that the officers' 
suspicion was reasonable under the fourth amendment. The specified 
factors do not "mysteriously become imbued with an aura of guilt 
merely by viewing them in their totality. Four times zero, in 
arithmetic, still equals zero." People v. Loewen 35 Cal.3d 117, 672 
P.2d 436, 444 (Cal. 1983) (quoting People v. Gale 9 Cal. 3d 788, 
511 P.2d 1204 (Cal. 1973) (dis.opn. of Mosk, J.)) 
1
 The State offered no testimony that either Ms. Holmes 
or the driver turned around to look at them or repeatedly checked 
the rear view mirror. 
-19-
Because the officers' detention of Ms. Holmes was not 
supported by a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, the 
detention violated the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. It is well settled that when the seizure and 
detention of the defendant is without the evidentiary justification 
required by the fourth amendment of the Constitution, the resulting 
evidence from the misconduct must be excluded from criminal trials. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 15. See also Trujillo, 739 P.2d. 85 Utah App. 
1988). 
Accordingly, the evidence obtained from Ms. Holmes should 
have been suppressed. Ms. Holmes respectfully requests that such 
evidence be suppressed, her conviction reversed, and the matter 
remanded for dismissal or a new trial without the illegally seized 
evidence. 
POINT II. THE DETENTION OF MS. HOLMES VIOLATED 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah is free to analyze search and seizure cases under 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution differently from case 
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law which is based on an interpretation of the fourth amendment to 
the United States constitution. In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 
(Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court inferred that a separate 
analysis of search and seizure cases under the Utah Constitution, 
article I, section 14 is warranted. Ijd* at 129 n.l. See also State 
v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986). 
In State v. Myrick, 688 P.2d 151, 153 (Wash. 1984), the 
Washington Supreme Court characterized the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the federal constitution as "guidance" in 
construing the Washington Constitution. The Myrick Court stated 
that, "[w]hile we may turn to the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the United States Constitution for guidance in establishing a 
hierarchy of values and principles under the Washington 
Constitution, we rely, in the final analysis, upon our own legal 
foundations in determining its scope and effect." Id. 
Illustratively, the Washington Supreme Court found that the 
Washington Constitution provided greater protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures by police to the people of 
Washington than did the federal constitution. State v. Jackson, 688 
P.2d 136, 143 (Wash. 1984). 
Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that it 
should "construe Alaska's constitutional provisions such as Article 
I, Section 14 as affording additional rights to those granted by the 
United States Supreme Court under the federal constitution," State 
v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 321 (Alaska 1985). In Jones, the Court 
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approved a more rigorous test to determine probable cause under 
Alaska law than is required under the federal constitution. 
Assuming arguendo that the factors relied upon by the 
officers supported a detention of Ms, Holmes not in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution, this Court may 
impose a more rigorous test to determine what constitutes reasonable 
suspicion under the Utah constitution. The facts of the present 
case should not support a justifiable intrusion of the protections 
granted to Ms. Holmes under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
constitution and thus the evidence that flowed from the unlawful 
seizure should have been suppressed. 
POINT III. EVEN IF THE STOP WERE LAWFUL, THE OFFICERS 
VIOLATED MS. HOLMES' RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE WHEN THEY SEIZED THE ROLL OF PAPER TOWELS AND 
UNWRAPPED IT. 
Assuming arguendo that the officers made a rightful stop 
and that consequently Lieutenant Gray was in a position where he was 
entitled to be, evidence obtained was nevertheless the result of an 
illegal search and seizure. 
in State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "warrantless seizures and searches are per 
se unreasonable unless the exigencies of the situation justify an 
exception." JLd. at 123, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967); see also State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983); State 
v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981). One exception specified by the 
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Cole Court to the warrant requirement is the doctrine that "objects 
within the plain view of an officer from a position where he is 
entitled to be are not the subject of an 
unlawful search." Cole, 674 P.2d at 123 [citations omitted]. 
The "plain view doctrine" requires (1) lawful presence of 
the officer which is incident to a lawful intrusion; (2) evidence 
which is in plain view; and (3) evidence which is clearly 
incriminating. State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983). The Kelly Court further 
explained that the third requirement that evidence be "clearly 
incriminating" means that there is "probable cause to associate the 
property with criminal activity." Kelly, 718 P.2d at 390 (quoting 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-742 (1983) (plurality opinion)). 
Probable cause requires that an officer "have a reasonable belief 
that the object viewed may be contraband or stolen property or 
useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that 
such a belief be correct. . . " Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. 
The object viewed by Lieutenant Gray consisted of a roll 
of paper towels (T. 31). In his testimony, Lieutenant Gray attached 
special significance to the paper towels and a roll of paper towels 
alone does not provide probable cause to associate the towels with 
criminal behavior. The only basis for a finding that the paper 
towels were "clearly incriminating evidence" provided by Lieutenant 
Gray to justify his seizure was that he "felt she (Ms. Holmes) was 
attempting to hide something from us." .Id. The inference from the 
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officer's testimony is that the paper towels became "clearly 
incriminating evidence" from his observation of Ms. Holmes removing 
the towels from her purse and "stuffing" them between a console and 
the car sear (T. 30). 
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), this 
Court examined a "furtive movement" subsequent to the approach of a 
police officer. In Trujillo, the officer saw the defendant shift 
his knapsack from his side to his front in a way considered by the 
officer to be an effort of concealment. When the officer 
approached, the defendant placed the knapsack next to a garbage can, 
an act which the officer regarded as an effort to "stash" the 
knapsack. 
This Court noted that the officer did not observe Mr. 
Trujillo engage in any criminal conduct nor did the officer inquire 
about the "suspicious" placement of the knapsack before subjecting 
Mr. Trujillo to the search which yielded a concealed weapon. 
Furthermore, this Court pointed out that the officer never 
articulated what concerned him about the knapsack. Ij3. at 86-89. 
In the present case, the officers did not observe Ms. 
Holmes engage in any criminal conduct, nor did Lieutenant Gray 
inquire about the "suspicious" placement of the paper towels before 
reaching inside the car and taking them. Similar to the facts of 
Trujillo, the officer only articulated a suspicion that Ms. Holmes 
was "attempting to hide something from us" to justify the seizure 
and search of the paper towels (T. 31). 
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The United States Supreme Courtfs opinion in Texas v. 
Brown 460 U.S. 730 (1983), suggests that an officer must articulate 
more than a subjective interpretation of a furtive movement in order 
to justify a seizure. In Brown, the officer testified that his 
seizure of a balloon from the defendant was based on his knowledge 
that balloons tied in the manner of the one seized were frequently 
used to carry narcotics. The officer's testimony of illicit drug 
practices was corroborated by a police department chemist. In 
addition, the seizure was based on other contents of the car which 
further suggested possession of illicit substances. Ij3. at 
742-743. In the instant case, where the visible item itself was not 
tied to criminal activity and the officer articulated only a 
subjective interpretation of an action, the seizure of the roll of 
paper towels and all articles within was not justified. 
Assuming arguendo that the seizure of the rolled up paper 
towel was legal, the officer effected an illegal search by unrolling 
the paper towels on the roof of the car in order to ascertain its 
contents. A closed container may not be opened without a warrant, 
even when the container is in plain view and the officer has 
probable cause to believe contraband is concealed within. United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In his concurrence in Brown, 
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stevens wrote: 
"if there is probable cause to believe it 
contains contraband, the owner's possesory 
interest in the container must yield to 
society's interest in making sure that the 
contraband does not vanish during the time 
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it would take to obtain a warrant. The item 
may be seized temporarily. It does not follow, 
howeverf that the container may be opened on 
the spot. Once the container is in custody, 
there is no risk that evidence will be destroyed 
Some inconvenience to the officer is entailed 
by requiring him to obtain a warrant before 
opening the container, but that alone does not 
excuse the duty to go before a neutral magistrate. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Brown, 460 U.S. at 749-50 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
Nor do the contents of the rolled paper towel in the 
present case fall within the distinctive configuration variation of 
the plain view doctrine. Pursuant to the "distinctive configuration 
variation" the contents of a container are considered to be within 
the searching officer's view because the distinctive configuration 
of the container proclaims its contents. State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 
119, 124 (Utah 1983); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981). 
The Cole Court found that a gun case inferred its contents due to 
its distinctive configuration. Cole, 674 P.2d at 124; Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
The contents of the rolled paper towel could not be 
ascertained by its configuration. A rolled paper towel could 
contain an infinite variety of items, if anything at all. Thus, the 
rolled paper towel does not invoke the distinctive configuration 
variation of the plain view doctrine. Therefore, Lieutenant Gray, 
even if justified in the seizure of the paper towels, effected an 
illegal search by not then obtaining a warrant to ascertain the 
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contents of the rolled towel as was within his power and which is 
required by the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Accordingly, the evidence obtained from within the rolled 
paper towels should be suppressed and Ms. Holmes requests that her 
conviction be overturned and the case remanded for a new trial 
absent the illegally seized evidence, or dismissal. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Holmes 
requests this Court to reverse the conviction and the trial court's 
ruling on the motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial 
court with an order to suppress the evidence, and dismiss the 
charges or provide for a new trial without such evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this /ffi day of August, 1988. 
'JAJ^ ES C. BRADSHAW 
:orney for Defendant/Appellant 
^dfc-C.ateX 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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